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ABSTRACT 
An analysis was made of several proposed counterbattery radar configu-
rations to aid the designer in selecting the best arrangement and to examine 
whether or not even this arrangement is a practical system. Although gaps in 
knowledge of tactics and of some physical aspects prevented application of a 
single measure of effectiveness, each influential factor was considered. Expert 
opinion was solicited whenever possible in such areas as photo-interpretation 
and aamouflage. 
The separated antenna system with equipment and operators in a van type 
trailer was judged the best of the proposed alternatives, primarily because 
of greater flexibility in its use, better mobility, and better adaptability 
to camouflage ) protection and efficient operation. Even this system however, 
shows promise of only low effectiveness. Furthermore, as has been emphasized 
in an earlier study, a CBR must be a very accurate device or it will have no 
effectiveness at all. 
Although a CBR with low effectiveness might have sufficient military value 
to be considered worth-while, it appears unwise to invest heavily in production 
of the proposed system when the rewards of increased effectiveness from improved 
designs would be so great. The recommendations of a previous study still appear 
valid and timely: an intensive development and testing program is needed with 
particular attention to miniaturization (for mobility, protection, and ease 
of camouflage), reliability and achievement of effective target locations at 
greater rates. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Objectives  
The objectives set forth for this study were to provide the basis for 
decision: first, in the choice between.a counterbattery radar (CBR) with a com-
bined search and track antenna system and a CBR with separated antenna systems; 
second, in the choice of packaging the remainder of the system; and last but 
most important, in the question of feasibility and practicality of the system. 
1.2 Conduct of Study  
It was recognized at the outset by General Electric (GE) and the Engineer-
ing Experiment Station (ERS),that the study proposed would suffer from a severe 
handicap: the dearth of input information of the sort needed to conduct an 
analysis with confidence and necessary to develop suitable models for study. 
Nevertheless, the decisions which must soon be faced in the course of the CBR 
development program were judged to be of sufficient importance to warrant an 
effort to make the most out of the few facts and considerable expert opinion 
available. 
The greatest void is in the information needed to develop a satisfactory 
tactical model incorporating concepts which will dictate the environment of the 
CBR. The mission and environment of CB artillery in this era of atomic weapons 
apparently are not yet sufficiently well defined in the military system to per-
mit detailed estimates to be set forth. It must be borne in mind that no real 
CBR has ever been used, there has been no modern military experience in which 
our forces were engaged with an artillery-minded enemy, and no battle has yet 
been fought that employed the concepts of tactical atomic weapons. It is evi-
dent that actual field data and experience are lacking. 
Extrapolation of related experience and the application of opinions can 
only be carried so far before confidence in results and predictions wanes 
rapidly. Therefore, to attempt to evaluate the performance and usefulness of 
a system not yet designed (and with no field-tested predecessor), in a new 
military role, and in tactical situations and environments that cannot be well 
defined is certainly an unappetizing task that has little promise of producing 
reliable specific results. 
However, certain things can be done that might enhance the background of 
information available to the system designer. Expert opinion in specialized 
fields can be assembled along with known facts to help make comparisons where 
the problem is to choose one of several alternatives. To help answer the ques-
tion of general feasibility or practicality, one can attempt to estimate the 
performance of a given system in all important aspects, and then one can com-
pare this with an estimate of the performance demanded by the mission in these 
same aspects. The extent to which such comparisons are favorable or unfavorable 
should give a basis for decision. 
The method of approach selected was that of outlining all the influential 
factors that should be considered in choosing a packaging arrangement and in 
deciding feasibility. These factors were organized into groups and subgroups 
as follows: (1) Performance with subdivisions of Coverage and Time factors, 
(2) Cost and (3) Flexibility and Other Factors, Each of these groups contains a 
number of factors which are basically important in analyzing the systems presented. 
It would be desirable to relate all these factors on the same scale of mea-
surement so that a single measure of effectiveness could be applied to the various 
configurations presented for consideration. .However, lack of data and lack of 
reliable models prevent such a classical treatment. The alternative, a qualita-
tive argument supported by some quantitative studies and by consultation with 
experts, was necessarily chosen. 
2. •Discussion of Influential Factors  
There are two objectives for the discussions that follow, namely, (1) to 
present the facts that are known about each factor, and (2) to state why and in 
what way the factors are important. 
2,1 Performance  
Performance is examined here assuming that specification requirements of 
range and accuracy will be achieved and that the alternative configurations will 
be equal in these respects. This stipulation permits consideration to be con-
centrated on two primary areas of performance: factors involved in coverage and 
factors involved in operational time. 
2.11 Coverage  
Coverage in the geographical and geometrical sense for a given physical en-
vironment defines that portion of an artillery environment that is potentially 
mengageable" by a CBR. It was recognized in previous studies that the physical 
environment introduces a tremendous influence on the usefulness of a specific 
CBR. This influence is directly discernible in the reduction in the number of 
trajectories that are potentially usable for location purposes as mask angles 
are increased and as a CBR is moved away from the zone of contact. 
Two important factors contribute to the coverage capability of a CBR. One 
of these is the range and sector capability which is determined by the technical 
characteristics of the system. The other is the siting capability which is 
determined partially by technical characteristics such as the ability to dis-
criminate between targets and ground clutter, and partially by physical aspects 
such as the ability to move into desirable sites and the ability to be camou-
flaged and protected there in such a way as to give a reasonable expectation of 
survival in a battlefield environment. 
2.111 Range and Sector Capability_ 
The range to which a CBR can operate effectively is, of course, determined 
by the target characteristics, the usual radar parameters of peak power, antenna 
gain, receiver characteristics, etc., and the ability to extrapolate. All of 
the CBR configurations presented for consideration are assumed to have equal 
range performance and therefore this important factor is not decisive in com-
paring the various alternatives. However, it is more difficult to determine 
if this degree of performance is sufficient for a practical system. 
x A previous study 0.) t  indicated that a capability of making locations out 
to a range of about 15 km would enable a CBR to cover most of the importaht prob-
lems in most of the situations involving World War II tactics. A recent Fort 
Sill study pointed out a need for a location range of 18 km for 75 mm or larger 
shells or rockets and at least 25 km or preferably 35 km for 100 mm or larger 
projectiles. It is not possible to evaluate the importance of these range 
requirements because the tactical background is not available to us. However, 
if we accept the Fart Sill figures as valid criteria, the range capability, of 
the proposed Service Test Model CBR falls short (and, of course, it has no 
capability for extrapolation of rocket trajectories). 
Numbers in parentheses throughout the report indicate the appropriate work in 
the list of references. 
The sector of coverage of a CBR is the angular sector which can be kept 
under surveillance and within which target acquisition can be accomplished. 
The system designers have indicated that the separated-antenna system would 
permit a sector of coverage of about 30° compared to 20 ° for the combined 
antenna arrangement and a "first round acquisition" probability 1.4 times 
greater for the separated system than for the other. The advantage of the 
separated system is greatest in these respects when enemy activity is low and 
when there is great interest in individual rounds. Separation of search and 
tracking functions permits uninterrupted surveillance during tracking operations, 
thereby effectively increasing coverage of this type. It is true that where 
artillery activity is more intense and where the artillery strength is greater, 
a CBR will be kept busy with acquisitions provided within a smaller sector. 
However, the separated system can perform as well or better in both situations 
and therefore appears superior from the standpoint of coverage. The emphasis 
on this better coverage dependb, of course, on the importance attached to the 
tactical situations. Some military opinions have given considerable weight to 
the ability to handle light activity. Although this does not seem justified in 
light of World War II tactics, it cannot be challenged now because of the void 
in background on tactics in an atomic era. 
Lack of this same information makes it virtually impossible to describe 
quantitatively what the optimum angular sector coverage should be in .a practical 
situation. Certainly the sector of surveillance and acquisition should not be 
smaller than that necessary to provide sufficient targets to keep the time 
between effective locations reasonably short for any given tactical situation, 
and it need not be larger than necessary to cover the area of interest in low 
activity periods with an economical number of systems. Ideally it appears that 
the system should have an acquisition sector variable in size between these 
limits while the area under surveillance is maintained at a maximum, 
2,112 Siting Capability  
The efficiency and effectiveness of a CBR system that uses a trajectory 
extrapolation scheme is critically dependent upon the choice of a good operat-
ing site. A site which is masked from most of a trajectory by terrain features 
may not permit the CBR to acquire enough data to adequately reconstitute the 
initial part of the trajectory in an extrapolation process. The CBR design is 
important here in eliminating clutter interference and in establishing the cri-
teria for what the CBR must "see" to extrapolate successfully. A CER that could 
acquire sufficient data in 2 seconds would be far more flexible in siting than 
one that requires 8 seconds of smooth data time; likewise, a CBR that could 
reconstitute 10 seconds of trajectory (in time back towards its origin) would 
be far easier to site effectively than one that could only reconstruct 4 seconds. 
However, the nature of a hostile arti llery complex is expected to be such that 
one could not arbitrarily afford to take "second choice" sites even if the CBR 
performance was greatly improved over that contemplated in the Service Test 
Model. Every bit of improved performance would be needed to increase the over-
all CBR effectiveness, which promises to be low at best. 
Tables in Annex A show the tremendous influence -of mask angle upon the per-
centage of trajectories that can be used in the artillery model with prospects 
of successful location for the presently proposed criteria of minimum smooth 
data time and maximum:extrapolation time. The mask in these tables is the com-
bined terrain and radar mask: the terrain and its features contribute a physical 
line-of-sight barrier, and the technical characteristics of the radar such as 
the beam width and clutter rejection contribute an additional increment of 
effective mask. Even for the most optimistic set of CBR technical character-
istics, the only way to get moderate effectiveness is to choose optimum sites 
that have the least mask. 
Several severe problems arise in making use of optimum sites. First, it 
must be possible to physically transport the CBR system to the site. Second, 
it must be possible to conceal or camouflage the system well enough to prevent 
deliberate hostile detection and counteraction for a reasonable period of time. 
Third, it must be possible for the system to be protected well enough to have 
a reasonable chance of survival in the battle area where it must be used. 
The terrain studies show that it is possible to find radar sites with suffi-
ciently small mask angles in almost all landforms provided that hilltops and 
ridge crests are used. This means that the system must be capable of reaching 
elevated sites, usually by off-road routes. To do this j the system will need 
to be even more mobile than the artillery in rugged terrain because the artil-
lery weapons will generally have a much greater choice of sites in more favorable 
areas. In general,. the system can operate in an area if it is sufficiently 
mobile to reach the optimum elevated site. Thus mobility and not visibility 
can be expected to keep the system from operating in mountainous terrain. 
Data showing the relation between terrain roughness and visibility are given 
in Annex B. 
Mobility aspects emphasize the importance of equipment packaging. Where 
the choice between vehicle types for prime-movers is concerned, these studies 
supply some assistance in choosing those which will be most mobile. For example, 
the soils trafficability work discussed in Annex B permits a comparison of per-
formance on slopes as a function of soil type. However, in answering questions 
on an absolute basis, there are gaps that prevent good quantitative results. 
These gaps are in the influence of micro-relief and vegetation and in the fre-
quency of occurrence of soil types. 
Because optimum CBR sites involve exposure to detection and enemy action, 
another important physical aspect is the adaptability of the system to camou-
flage and protection. The application of good camouflage practices will dis-
guise the nature of the system, will conceal it from certain forms of direct 
observation and will delay the detection of the system by photo-interpretation. 
Since the CBR must operate on the battleground, these are exceedingly important 
points. 
Good camouflage in the field depends on small size, care in emplacement, 
care in concealing or disguising approach routes and good general camouflage 
discipline at all times. Disguise enroute is important in concealing the 
presence of the system from enemy intelligence; this requires that vehicles 
with a distinctive appearance be avoided. During operation of the system, 
moving antenna reflectors would invite detection; therefore, a radome over the 
track antenna, though difficult to hide with present materials, is preferable 
to the exposed antenna. 
Although there will be many times when track-laying prime movers will be 
essential, the use of such vehicles enroute and in emplacement invites detection 
because of the way they disrupt the natural appearance of the area. Personnel 
of the Camouflage Branch, ERDL, favor emplacement (digging in) by hand labor; 
experience and studies have shown that this procedure is only slightly more time 
consuming and far excells in the concealment provided in that there is less 
disruption to the natural appearance of the site. 
The problem of protecting a CBE on the battleground is a serious one 
inasmuch as sites will be located in areas subject to hostile shelling, 
strafing and other action even if the system is not detected or recognized. 
Physical protection can be provided by "digging in," by shielding with sand-
bags and by making use of natural protective features of the terrain wherever 
possible. A vehicle configuration that is small and has a low silhouette wil4 
of course, be easier to protect than a larger arrangement. Certainly the sys-
tem should be well enough protected that operations can be conducted during a 
battle with reasonable confidence that only a direct hit will seriously disable 
the system. If this is not done, the system may be put out of action when it 
is most needed. Annex E gives some insight into the potential vulnerability of 
a CBR to shell fire. 
A short march-order time and a high degree of mobility must be achieved 
with a CBR if it is to be protected by withdrawal when threatened by enemy 
patrol action or reconnaissance in force. It must be remembered that the 
threat of atomic attack may enforce a troop dispersal that would be particu-
larly vulnerable to infiltration by patrols or rapid penetration. An effective 
CBR would certainly be a high priority enemy target and would have to be 
defended or withdrawn accordingly. 
2.12 Time Factors  
It is convenient to classify as time factors several important performance 
characteristics: transport speed, emplacement and march-order times, reliability, 
and weather limitations. t Each of these factors has an influence on the fraction 
of total calendar time which can be available for searching and tracking. 
The evaluations of these factors which can be made at present do not show 
up any marked superiority of either of the proposed CBR systems. Time factors 
are therefore of interest not for comparing systems, but rather for judging 
the feasibility of either system. In a hypothetical "middle of the road" 
example described in Annex D it is estimated that as the result of the combined 
The CBR system's problem solution rate can also be regarded as a time factor, 
but one of a slightly different nature. Solution rates are not discussed in this 
section, but are considered in the model "Battery Acquisition" problem of Annex F. 
influences of all time factors, the CBR might be in "ready" condition 66 per 
cent of the time. 
2.121 Movement Time  
The process of moving the CBR from one site to another involves three 
operations: tear-down, transport, and set-up. The times associated with these 
operations can be lumped together and regarded as "movement time." 
Assuming a crew of twelve enlisted men (plus one officer and one noncom-
missioned officer), GE estimates that under average conditions the time required 
for setting up and checking the equipment will be about 45 minutes for the 
combined-antenna system and one hour and 15 minutes for the separate-antenna 
system.(2) These times do not include allowances for surveying, digging in, or 
camouflaging. They are therefore limits which might be approached through ade-
quate site preparation prior to the arrival of the radar. Presumably, at least 
at night, the system could go on the air before the operations vans are dug in 
and sandbagged and before camouflaging is completed. 
As a rough estimate, the time to pack up for an orderly withdrawal can be 
taken to be about two-thirds of the set-up time: 30 minutes for the combined 
antenna system and 50 minutes for the separate-antenna system. The figUre for 
the latter system might be shortened if more than twelve men were available. 
The tear-down time for each antenna unit alone (search, track, or combined) is 
estimated by Goodyear to be about 30 minutes for a trained crew of eight men.(3) 
The time required for transport depends, quite obviously, upon the distance 
to be traveled, the mobility of the system, and the condition and density of 
roads in the battle area. Since radar sites must be chosen in elevated postions, 
the transport route is likely to consist of three legs: an off-road path from 
the abandoned site to the nearest road, a route by road to a point near the new 
site, and an off-road path from there to the final position. From studies of 
road density as a function of population density and local relief, Peltier has 
concluded that in civilized parts of the world each off-road leg will seldom 
exceed one mile in length.(4) Even so, the average off-road transport speed can 
be so slow that the major portion of the total transport time is spent on these 
legs. 
When the movement operation is considered as a whole, it is evident that 
the march-order and set-up time advantages of the combined-antenna system can 
be over-balanced by its slower off-road transport speed, The trafficability 
studies which can be made at the present time, however, lack the detailed "reso-
lution" needed for a meaningful comparison of the two systems in this respect. 
Movement time estimates which are too crude to reveal any superiority of 
one system over the other are nevertheless of value for assessing the general 
practicality of either system. In the example discussed in Annex D the average 
movement time is taken to be 3.1 hours and the frequency of movement as once 
per day. The fraction of total calendar time during which the radar is set up 
in operating position would then be ,87. 
2.122 Reliability  
In the present study reliability has been given greater attention than other 
time factors; first, because it is better suited to analytical treatment, and 
second, because it is spectacularly influenced by design, maintenance, and opera-
tion procedures. Without careful attention to such procedures, there appears 
to be little chance of achieving acceptable performance. A reliability analysis 
of the AN/TPQ-5( ), made possible by recent studies by Aeronautical Radio, Inc., 
(5) is presented in Annex C. Reliability predictions have also been made for 
the AN/TPQ-5( ) by GE. 
Among the measures of reliability discussed in Annex C, the following are 
of particular interest, 
(1)Considering breakdown as the only impediment to operation, what is the 
probability P that the radar will be operable at a randomly chosen time? 
100 Pe can be
e 
 interpreted as "per cent operable time." 
(2)If the radar is operable at some given time, what is the probability 
P(X >At) that it will continue to operate without failure throughout a 
mission of duration At? 
The latter probability is determined by the system's mean life between failures 
(which can be estimated by ARINC's methods), and the former by the mean repair 
time as well. 
Working with the probability of P(X > At), one can examine the significance 
of the reliability requirement established for a CBR by the Combat Development 
Department, Fort Sill: the system "shall be capable of 23 hours continuous 
operation out of 24 hours, without excessive breakdown." The probability of 
no breakdown in 23 hours, P(X >23), is estimated by GE to be 0.9 for a well-
engineered AN/TPQ 5( ). This corresponds roughly to a mean life of 10 hours, 
which agrees with the estimate inferred by ARG, Princeton University, from an 
analysis of field maintenance data on the M-33 radar.(1) Although "without 
excessive breakdown" is open to interpretation, this level of reliability is 
clearly unacceptable. However, GE has further estimated that by providing for 
preventive maintenance this probability can be raised to .62, corresponding to 
a mean life of about 50 hours. 
While preventive maintenance can thus improve reliability enormously, if 
one tries to keep the radar on the air continuously there is still a good chance 
of its being out of order when it is needed most. Suppose, as seems likely, 
that there will be periods of urgent need of about four hours duration inter-
spersed among longer periods of little or no need. The probability of the radar 
being operable during all of a randomly occurring four-hour period is the pro-
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The outlook can be improved if the radar is kept in a standby condition when 
it is not needed, with only heater voltages applied. The ARINC study indicates 
that by reducing the heater voltage to .8 of its normal value, standby failures 
can be made very small. Consequently, if the set is in standby most of the time, 
Pe approaches unity and the mission survival probability varies between .67 and 
.92 as the mean life is increased from 10 to 50 hours. The latter figure should 
be acceptable. 
It thus appears that acceptable reliability is attainable through a combina-
tion of: 
(1)Good design, including component derating and mechanical construction 
which minimizes susceptibility to shock damage. 
(2)Preventive maintenance and built-in testing facilities for detecting 
incipient failures, 
(3)Standby provisions for reducing heater voltages to lower the failure 
rate during inactive periods. 
The differences in reliability for the proposed separate- and combined-antenna 
alternatives are relatively small; the effects of the measures listed above are 
much more important than the effects of the slight differences in complexity of 
the alternate systems. 
2.123 Weather Limitations  
It has been recognized that a CBR such as the AN/TPQ-5( ), operating on 
X-band, may be expected to be almost completely useless in the presence of pre-
cipitation, even a light drizzle or light snowfall.(6) For this reason the 
assistance of the Air Weather Service was sought to determine as much as pos-
sible about the frequency of occurrence of precipitation on a worldwide basis. 
Maps of the world which show estimates of the percentage of total time during 
which precipitation occurs are presented in Annex B, along with a more complete 
discussion. 
In the example of Annex D it is assumed that precipitation occurs 14 per 
cent of the time, a figure obtained by taking a year-round average over 169 
localities in the United States, Europe (including Russia to the Urals), and 
southeastern Asia. This averaging procedure is a convenient device for arriv-
ing at a "typical" figure for purposes of illustration; however, because of the 
wide variation in climate from place to place and season to season (evident upon 
inspection of the maps) ; the result must be interpreted with considerable caution. 
2.2 Costs  
In passing final judgment on the feasibility of a CBR, someone must compare 
the cost and effort required to procure and support a CBR with the cost and 
effort that would be required to achieve the same results by other means. Like-
wise, a similar comparison between alternate CBR configurations would be help-
ful in arriving at the optimum choice. 
Such comparisons could be very difficult and time consuming if all logisti-
cal aspects are thoroughly considered or they could be relatively simple if only 
rough approximations of magnitude are adequate to supply the basis for decision. 
In this study, the latter assumption is made. The various cost data and esti-
mates that have been found to be available are assembled in the paragraphs which 
follow. 
2.21 Dollar Costs  
The following table summarizes some of the preliminary estimates of CBR 
cost for the items indicated. 
TABU', 1 
ESTIMATED DOLLAR COST OF MAJOR ITEMS IN CBR SYSTEM 
(Figures Rounded to Nearest $100.00) 
Combined System 	 Separated System 
Radar Equipment 	 $300,000 	 $320,000 
Prime Movers 
2_M5 Tractors 	$ 40,500 	 6_4 Toh Trucks 	$ 64,500 
2-4 Ton Trucks $ 21,500 
Engine Generators 
2-30 kw Diesels 	$ 10,000 	 2_30 kw Diesels 	$ 10,000 
2_M 18 Trailers $ 5,300 2_M 18 Trailers $ 5,300 
Total 	 $377,300 	 $399,800 
The radar equipment costs in Table 1 are preliminary GE estimates of quan-
tity production figures. The engine-generator cost estimates were made after 
reviewing the costs of somewhat similar Corps of Engineer and commercial power 
units. Vehicular costs were obtained from the sources indicated in Table 2. 
It can be seen that the cost in dollars of the alternative arrangements 
is roughly equivalent and that the crudity in the estimates of production cost 
would be large compared to the difference in total costs that are indicated. 
The small advantages in price of the combined system indicated here could be 
easily offset as a result of increased flexibility of the separated systems; 
for example, by operating two trackers with each search system, it might be pos-
sible to do the work of 10 combined systems with 10 trackers and 5 search systems. 
Such examples are merely speculative at the moment since the optimum proportion 
of systems is yet to.be determined, but certainly such considerations must be 
borne in mind. 
TABLE 2 


















M5, Al, A2) A3 124-127 9-11 men 20,000 $20 273.00 
Truck, Cargo, 
2-1/2 Ton, 
6x6, with winch 227 5,350 lbs 4,500 $ 4,818.00 
Truck, Cargo, 
2-1/2 Ton, 
6x6, M35, with 




with winch 233 5.000 lbs 6.000 6 647.00 
Truck, Cargo, 
4-Ton, 6x6, 







M41 	with winch 266 10 350 lbs 15 000 $16,367.00 
Truck, Prime-
Mover, 6-Ton, 
6x6) with winch  276 12 350 lbs 16 500 	 $15 . 562.00 
From ORD 5-3-1, 13 October 1955. 
2,22 Personnel Requirements 
The following table summarizes the estimated CBR personnel requirements 
to accomplish the functions of emplacement, operation and movement. When the 
personnel requirements are consolidated, it is evident that a minimum crew size 
of about 15 men is needed for 24--hour operation of either CBR arrangement, 
This is consistent with the team size of 15 men for operation of the AN/MPQ-10. 
It is evident that other specific tasks must be accomplished in addition to 
oppeftwomAL 
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those enumerated in Table 3. Camouflage and "digging-in" operations must be 
carried out during and immediately subsequent to emplacement; security and 
sentry duty must be performed; and certain "housekeeping" or administrative 
tasks must be accomplished. 
TABLE 3 
ESTIMATED PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS 















(1) Search 1 3 1 3 
(2) Track 1 3 1 3 
(3) Compute 1 3 1 3 
(4) Liaison 3 1 3 
Power Source 
Operation 1 1 1 1 
Supervisory 
Personnel 1 2 1 2 
Emplacement 12 12 
Prime-Mover 
Operators 4 6 
Total Men Rqd. 
for 24-hour 
Operation 	 15 
	
15 
In addition to the crew needed for operations, personnel will be needed to 
maintain the CBR. In the past, such technicians were provided in a 2nd and 3rd 
echelon radar maintenance team of about 6 to 10 men; a team generally maintained 
a number of radars in a given area and was equipped to move with its maintenance 
equipment from one radar to another as the need arose. This is the maintenance 
plan assumed in Annex C. It is not known whether such a plan will be applied 
to a CBR. However, it might well be that a better arrangement would be to have 
at least one and perhaps two well trained technicians from a maintenance team 
stay constantly with each CBR of either configuration. Provisions could be 
made for assistance and special equipment when needed from the remainder of 
the team, which could include the better trained and more experienced main-
tenance supervisors. If the technicians in the depot maintenance shops are 
also considered, it appears that the prorated requirement for technicians in 
the field would be about 3 or 4 men per CBR. This number appears consistent 
with the Naval Electronic Laboratory estimate of "one maintenance technician 
for each 250 tubes."(7) Certainly the importance of reliability and the key 
role of preventive maintenance procedures, as described in Annex C, would make 
it unwise to plan on a weaker maintenance structure. 
.Thus, the personnel requirements for either CBR configuration add up to 
a minimum of about 20 men when both operations and maintenance are considered. 
2.23 Related Equipment  
In addition to basic CBR electronic equipment and the vehicles containing 
it, an appreciable amount of auxilliary equipment will be required. Two of the 
major items, prime movers and power units, were considered in paragraph 2.21, 
Dollar Costs. Other items area spare maintenance components, tools and test 
equipment, camouflage material, administrative materials and supplies for 
"housekeeping," communications and general transportation. Except for the 
number and type of prime movers, the requirements of either CBR configuration 
appear to be about the same. 
2.2 1  Resources  
Estimates obtained on the amount of manufacturing and material resources 
required indicate no significant difference for the various CBR configurations. 
2.25 Cost of an Artillery Batter 
When the end effect of a CBR is interpreted as an increase in effective 
counterbattery firepower, a CBR can be compared costwise with the equivalent 
number of batteries it provides. 
Table 4 summarizes the cost of Ordnance Corps items issued to an 8-inch 
howitzer battery. Tools and small arms were excluded from the battery cost 
tabulation, along with equipment supplied by Quartermaster, Chemical and other 
services, in the belief that such items would be common to both a radar or a 
howitzer unit in amounts roughly proportional to the number of men in the units. 
Personnel assigned to an 8-inch howitzer battery number 127 men, of which 
84 are assigned to the four gun sections. 
.TABLE 4 
ESTIMATED COST OF 8" HOWITZER BATTERY 
Description of Item 	 tNumber 
Issued 
8-inch Howitzer with Carriage, Limber 	 4 










Trailer, Cargo, 1/4-Ton (M100) 2 271 542 
Trailer, Cargo, 1 1/2-Ton 2 978 1,956 
Trailer, Water, 1 1/2-Ton (m106) 1 1,132 1,132 
Truck, Cargo, 3/4-Ton, 4 x 4 w/w 2 3 ,757 7,514 
Truck, Cargo, 2 1/2-Ton, 6x 6,1wb, wo/w 1 4 ,446 4,446 
Truck, Cargo, 2 1/2-Ton, 6 x 6, w/w (M34) 2 7,132 14,264 
Truck, Cargo, 5-Ton, 6 x 6, lwb, w/w 4 16,367 65,468 
Truck, Command, 3/4-Ton, 4 x 4, w/w (M42) 3 3,780 11,340 
Truck, Utility, 1/4-Ton, 4 x 4, 	(438) 4 2,410 9,640 
Aiming Circle 2 516 1,032 
Total Cost of Battery $584,414 
tFrom TO/E 6-417R 
ttFrom ORD 5-3-1 
2.3 Other Factors  
Other influential factors are primarily those in the area of general flexi-
bility. Some of these are in aspects that could have been considered under cost 
and performance if sufficient quantitative information were available to describe 
their influence. 
The capability of independent surveillance and independent tracking func-
tions provided by the separated antenna systems permits a more efficient and 
effective utilization of equipment in several respects: 
(1) Adjustment missions can be performed with only the tracking system. 
(2) General surveillance and "active" battery surveillance missions can 
be performed with only the search system. Furthermore, search functions are 
not curtailed while tracking is in progress. Therefore, surveillance coverage 
is more continuous. 
(3) The ratio of track to search systems can presumably be varied to meet 
the demands of the tactical situation. 
(4) Either the search or the track system can be repaired, modified, im-
proved or replaced independently of the other. 
All of the foregoing points support the choice of a CBR with separated antenna 
systems. There are some features associated with the separated systems that are 
not particularly desirable, however. Some additional cables are required, thereby 
exposing the system to a greater risk to damage. A parallax corrector and .a sur-
vey between the two antenna systems may be necessary if separation of the two sys-
tems is relatively large, as might be the case for some acquisition aspects. 
These undesirable features do not appear to present a serious problem and would 
be far outweighed by the advantages in flexibility achieved with the separated 
systems. 
3. .Evaluation of Influential Factors  
Although it was not possible to develop a single measure of effectiveness 
that would allow the influence of each factor to be introduced in an analytical 
expression, it has been possible to compare the various alternatives and to con-
sider overall system practicality in light of these factors. 
3.1 The Choice of Antenna S stems and Vehicle Types 
Two antenna configurations are being considered for the Service Test Model: 
one arrangement is generally similar to the experimental model AN/TPQ-5(XE-1) in 
that a combined antenna system is used for both search and tracking functions; 
the other arrangemeht provides for completely separate antenna systems for search-
ing and for tracking. The equipment and operations vehicle could be either a van 
or walk-around type and either of these could be a truck-mounted arrangement, a 
semi-trailer or trailer. 
It is important to keep in mind that only the alternative configurations 
presented by the equipment designers were considered and compared. In addition, 
it was necessary to make comparisons by assuming that the performance estimates 
of the designers would be realized. The choice of either type system on this 
basis could not be extrapolated to apply unconditionally to all systems purely 
on the basis of combined or separated antennas. The numerous factors that must 
be considered could favor either choice depending upon the exact nature and 
performance of any given configuration. 
Impressive arguments in favor of the separated antenna system are pre-
sented in the preceding discussions of influential factors. More effective 
operation can be achieved by the separated system because it is better suited 
to cope with both the physical and battle environments and because of greater 
flexibility which permits independent performance of track and search functions. 
Experts have predicted greater mobility and better adaptability to camou-
flage and protection with separated antennas, Primarily because smaller vehi-
cle sizes and weights can be achieved with this arrangement. These are extreme-
ly important considerations inasmuch as the operational effectiveness of a CBR 
depends critically on its ability to be located in an optimum site and, once 
there, to survive in the battlefield environment. 
The trafficability studies in Annex B show that when a reasonable choice 
of wheeled prime-movers is made for both alternatives, the separated system 
can be expected to negotiate a slope that is about 4 or 5 degrees steeper for 
the same soil conditions. If both systems are equipped with track-laying prime-
movers, the separated system can operate over slopes that are about 5 to 7 
degrees steeper. The landform studies in Annex B (Figures B-2 and B-3) show 
that these differences in negotiable slope may be quite significant in all land-
form classes, and particularly in the lower land forms characterized by Millen, 
Georgia and Chocowinity, North Carolina. The frequency of occurence of various 
slopes is given for six typical terrain types in Annex B, Figures B-2 and B-3. 
From these figures the reader can determine the slopes that will be encountered 
in these landforms. 
Since enemy counteraction can be expected to cause frequent relocations, 
it is also important that-off-road movement be accomplished with reasonable 
speed and without elaborate route preparation. It is clear that if all other fac-
tors were equal, the system with the greater mobility as evidenced by the greater 
gradability, lower center of gravity and lesser weight would have a decisive 
operational advantage when considered over a large number of varied engagements. 
Camouflage and photo-interpretation'experts have judged the separated sys-
tem to be better adapted for battlefield survival. Although such a system 
would eventually be located by the enemy, better adaptability to camouflage 
would allow a longer time for operation before relocation was forced by the 
enemy. The system with the smaller equipment size would also be easier to 
"dig-in" or sandbag for protection against shell fragments. 
Figure 1 is presented to display the factor-by-factor comparison of the 
two types of antenna systems. Plus (+) signs indicate an advantage in the 
factor concerned, minus (-) signs indicate a disadvantage, and zeros (0) indi-
cate no significant differences. In only one case is the advantage in favor 
of the combined antenna system, whereas eight of the 17 factors listed favor 
the separated system. The preponderance of advantage is such that no weighting 
factors are needed to show the superiority of the separated system. 
After the choice of antenna system is made, the method of packaging the 
rest of the system must be selected. Here again mobility considerations and 
adaptability to camouflage and protection are primary considerations. 
Certainly, flexibility in the choice of prime movers would adapt the system 
to a wider range of terrain types and situations_ Although a truck might be the 
normal prime mover, micro-relief characteristics in some regions might dictate 
that a track-laying prime mover be used. General off-road mobility and maneuver-
ability must be achieved through go9d gradability, low weight, small size, low 
center of gravity and good suspension characteristics. Some of these same char-
acteristics would,of course, increase the adaptability to camouflage and "digging-
in." 
Figure 2 presents a comparison of these factors for trailer, semi-trailer 
and self-propelled vehicle arrangements. As in Figure 1, plus signs (+) indi-
cate an advantage and zeros (0) indicate no significant difference. 
The overall advantage of a trailer arrangement is apparent. The greatest 
flexibility in choice of prime-movers is, of course, achieved with a trailer; 
a semi-trailer when used with a "doll" could, of course, be pulled by the same 
prime-movers but the maneuverability is limited to that of a 2-axle trailer. 
The self-propelled arrangement is the least flexible. 
Off-road mobility is difficult to disassociate from prime-mover performance; 
the overall height, gradability and center of gravity of the whole combination 
are important. The advantages of the self-propelled arrangement on smooth 
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Figure 1. Comparison of Influential Factors for Choice of Antenna System 
Arrangement. 
slopes could be offset in more rugged terrain by poor side-slope characteris-
tics and poor clearance of overhead obstructions. For best all-around per-
formance, a trailer with a prime-mover selected to suit the situation at hand 
seems to be best. Maneuverability is influenced by these same considerations. 
.Flexibility in Choice of Prime Mover 
Off-Road Mobility and Maneuverability 
Adaptability to Camouflage 
Adaptability to Protection and 
Emplacement 





Figure 2. Comparison of Influential Factors for Choice of Equipment and 
Operations Vehicle Type. 
A trailer with its lower silhouette is better adapted to camouflage and 
"digging-in;" a truck-mounted arrangement with its high silhouette and greater 
overall size would be the most difficult to protect. However, a self-propelled 
arrangement would have some advantage in rapid displacement. If the equipment 
trailer was the slowest part of the system in this respect, some weight would 
be due this consideration, but the march order time for the antenna trailers 
appears to be the determining factor in overall system displacement. 
In this limited study it was not possible to compare the merits of 
single-axle trailers with those of other arrangements. Experts have commented 
on the better riding qualities of multiple axle trailers or trailers with 
bogie suspensions, but while these arrangements are better adapted to go over 
rough ground, they are generally not as maneuverable. A track-laying, self-
propelled and armored arrangement might be worthwhile fora certain percent-
age of the CBR's for use in difficult situations; there would be no advantage 
in this, however, unless the antenna systems were similarly packaged. 
There remains the choice between van type or walk-around type trailers. 
The van type offers obvious advantages in operator efficiency, in ease of main-
tenance and in rapid emplacement or displacement. Operation under black-out 
conditions is simplified as are heating and cooling problems, when a van is 
used. A walk-around arrangement offers some advantage in adaptability to 
camouflage and protection when comparison is with a large van; this advantage 
disappears as the van size is made smaller. The comparison of factors in 
Figure 3 indicates that the van type trailer is the better choice, 
Walk- 
Van 	 Around 
Type Type 
Operator Efficiency 
Adaptability to Protection and Emplacement 	0 	 0 
Adaptability to Enroute Disguise 	 - 
Adaptability to Camouflage 	 0 	 0 
Flexibility in Prime-Mover Choice 	 0 0 
Equipment Reliability and Ease of 
Maintenance 	 - 
Rapid Emplacement and Displacement 
Dollar Cost 	 0 	 0 
tIn this comparison it is assumed that the van size would be relatively small 
and that special efforts would be made to keep the van height to a minimum 
(not over about 9 ft.). 
Figure 3. Comparison of Influential Factors for Choice of Equipment and 
Operations Trailer Type, 
3.2 Evaluation of Feasibility  
To determine whether or not the proposed CBR is a practical military 
system requires, first, an estimate of the effectiveness of the system, and 
second, a decision as to whether or not such effectiveness is worth the cost 
it entails. Unfortunately, serious gaps exist in the definition of the tacti-
cal environment and to an extent, in the physical environment. These defi= 
ciencies in data preclude establishment of a single measure of effectiveness 
that would allow a clear-cut rating of a CBR. However, it is possible to pre- 
sent a general qualitative picture, based on the influential factors previousjy 
discussed, that should at least permit judgment of whether the effectiveness 
is nil, low, moderate or good: 
Any picture of effectiveness must be based, first of all, on the assump-
tion that the technical performance in accuracy, range, etc, stated in the 
specifications will be met. Next, a CBR with these technical characteristics 
and packaged in the better of the alternatives discussed above, (i.e., with 
separated antenna systems and with van type trailers) can be considered in a 
physical and tactical environment to answer two important questions: What 
portion of the time can a CBR be expected to be available for useful operation, 
and what capacity does it have for providing usable locations during this period 
of time? 
The first question can be conveniently approached by using a "middle-of-
the-road" model incorporating the major predictable factors influencing oper-
able time. This was done in Annex D. Under the conditions assumed in the 
model, it appears that over a long period, a CBR might be in a "ready" condi-
tion about 2/3 of the time and that variations in maintenance and standby 
techniques could cause this figure to be as low as 1/2 or as high as 3/ 1 , (It 
must be remembered, however, that since advance knowledge and some control 
exist in the initiation of offensive action, some of the controllable dead 
times might be scheduled to occur at unimportant time periods,) The average 
time estimated to be available for operation in the model would be degraded 
by the amount of time lost as a result of the following: 
(1) Time spent in awaiting darkness to emplace the system. 
(2) Time out of action as a result of hostile attack or damage, 
(3) Time out of action as a result of impassable terrain. 
(I) Time out of action for major overhaul. 
It is apparent that enemy action, adverse weather, etc. could keep the 
CBR out of action for considerable periods of time and these periods might be 
times of great need. Increasing the number of CBR systems assigned to an obser-
vation battalion might enable the location capability to be maintained during 
movement, repair and battle loss, but equipment redundancy would not help 
during rains or in situations where routes to usable sites were impassable. 
The artillery model of Annex A gives indication of what can be expected 
in operational effectiveness. Even if the very best sites are used (those 
within 4000 yds of the zone of contact having combined radar and terrain masks 
of between 50 and 100 mils) only about 20 per cent to 55 per cent of the enemy 
artillery trajectories might be "visible" to the CBR and, since some of these 
would not be suitable for extrapolation, a total of about 5 per cent to 55 
per cent might yield successful locations. Tables A-4 and A-5 of Annex A show 
how much this already low ability to engage enemy trajectories is deteriorated 
as mask angle and CBR distance from the zone of contact are increased. 
The outlook is even more grim as a result of several factors which degrade 
the effective operational rate of producing usable locations: 
(1) Part of the CBR time will be wasted with trajectories that are visi-
ble and acquirable but which, for various reasons such as multiple target 
interference, might yield poor tracking data or with trajectories that are 
seen too late or for too short a time to be successfully extrapolated by the 
CBR. 
(2) Part of the CBR time will be wasted as a result of redundant loca-
tion of the same batteries. In the model considered in Annex F, the loss of 
efficiency from this effect is appreciable. Even in those cases where all 
visible trajectories are usable, location of 90 per cent of the accessible 
batteries requires acquisition of 2.5 to 4 times that number of projectiles. 
(3) Part of the CBR time will be wasted when rocket and mortar project-
iles are acquired. 
(4) An effective CBR would prompt enemy countermeasures such as those 
enumerated in the A-108 report, (1) which would interfere with the operational 
rate of the system. 
Although the CBR rate of operation is such that about 1 minute is required 
for a complete operational cycle, the foregoing factors lead to the estimates 
that the maximum effective rate of operation in active combat situations, 
even with good search and acquisition features, might be degraded by a fac-
tor of 3 to 5 from the rate established by the equipment alone. This means 
that a CBR (with one tracker) might be expected to yield on the order of 10 
to 20 usable locations in an hour if the enemy exposed his artillery enough 
for this to be possible. While this location rate may be more acceptable 
for the "open" type disposition of weapons expected in an "atomic war" than 
World War II tactics, it shows that a good portion of the hostile artillery 
can conduct fire for an appreciable time before counteraction can be initi-
ated. Additional trackers could be provided in a given area to compensate 
for some of the degrading factors so that more batteries are located in a 
short time. However, there would always remain a large portion of hostile 
artillery with fire missions that would not yield trajectories suitable for 
use by a CBR of the type under consideration-. 
The preceding paragraphs show that the CBR effectiveness can only be 
described as low. Assuming perfect technical performani-e, the outlook is 
discouraging: 
1) The system will be completely useless part of the time because of 
weather, part of the time because it will be immobilized in difficult terrain, 
and part of the time for major overhaul. 
2) It will almost always be difficult to move into position and to 
emplace the systeM in effective sites. 
3) The enemy can certainly locate the CBR without great difficulty or 
delay and can attack the system with good probability of success. The very 
best in camouflage techniques will be required but even these will only "buy 
time," The vulnerability of portions of the system can be reduced by thorough 
"digging-in" but the antenna systems must remain exposed. 
4) The system will be out of operation a good portion of the time under 
ideal conditions, especially in fluid situations; even when it is operating 
it can only deal effectively with a small percentage of the hostile batteries, 
and this can only be accomplished at a relatively slow rate. 
The picture is not complete, however, unless the cost aspects are con-
sidered. To do this, it is convenient to consider the CBR as a tool which 
increases the effectiveness of the artillery it supports. The dollar pro-
curement cost for major items of equipment in an 8-inch Howitzer battery is 
about $580,000; this could be considered as an investment in firepower which 
the military planners are willing to make independently of the cost of support-
ing such a battery in the field. A CBR, including major items of equipment, 
is estimated to cost about $400,000 with one tracker, or about $650,000 with 
two trackers. It can be seen, therefore, that a CBR would be a worthwhile 
investment if it provided an increase in effective firepower equivalent to 
about one battery of heavy artillery. If the increased location accuracy 
provided by the CBR enabled a counterbattery battalion, for example, to 
achieve the same effect on a target with concentrations of 24 rounds instead 
of 36 rounds, the same battalion could fire on 15 targets in an hour instead 
of 10 targets. This increase in effective firepower is, at least, crudely 
equivalent to adding 1 1/2 batteries. An examination of the effect of in-
creasing system accuracy is contained in the A-108 report. (1) (This is the 
accuracy of the over-all process of locating one weapon of a battery and 
centering a pattern of fire upon it.) It can be shown from the work there 
that to maintain a high probability of covering most of a typical target area 
with a density of fire sufficient for neutralization would require a counter-
fire concentration of eight battalion volleys if system errors were circularly 
distributed with a standard deviation of 75 meters; but if the standard devi-
ation could be reduced to 50 meters, only four volleys would be needed. 
A brief glance at some of the other costs involved is enlightening. 
There are approximately 127 men in an 8-inch Howitzer battery contrasted with 
about 20 to 25 for a CBR; a battery can fire about $10,000 to $15,000 worth 
of ammunition in just one hour. It is readily apparent that at least one, 
and probably several, CBR's could be supported for the costs of maintaining 
one 8-inch Howitzer battery. 
On a dollar basis alone, it is obvious that the expenditure of large 
amounts of money is justified to gain additional artillery effectiveness for 
counterbattery artillery. In other words, it appears possible to justify 
even a CBR with low effectiveness if cost is the criterion. However, there 
is evidence that, at least on certain occassions, counterbattery efforts have 
been almost completely ineffective. ORO studied the problem of counter-
battery effectiveness for certain periods in Korea (8) and found no evidence 
The estimated shell density required for neutralization has been revised 
from One round per 400 square meters to one round per 800 square meters at 
the suggestion of CDD, Ft. Sill. The latter figure is used here. 
of appreciable neutralization, although over 10 per cent of the corps artil-
lery and 20 per cent of the division artillery ammunition was expended in 
counterbattery fire. This poor effectiveness is attributed largely to the 
inaccuracy of counterbattery fire. It would seem, therefore, that the CBR, 
even with low effectiveness, would be worth far more than is first apparent: 
it would not only give the additional effective firepower of one or more 
batteries, it could conceivably, through both the target :Location and adjust-
ment roles, give some effectiveness to the entire counterbattery organization 
in situations where effectiveness normally might not exist. It is critically 
important to realize that the effectiveness anticipated here is that result-
ing from attainment of high location and adjustment accuracy; as pointed out 
in the A-108 report, (1) the effectiveness vanishes"if this accuracy is not 
achieved. 
In summary it can be seen that the proposed CBR can be expected to have 
only a low effectiveness as a target location device. Although even a small 
increase in effectiveness would be worth much to the artillery forces, it 
does not necessarily, follow that the CBR should be procured in quantity. The 
rewards of improved designs could be so great that it appears best to suggest 
that the military procure only the very minimum amount dictated by their esti-
mate of necessity and that great effort should be applied toward the develop-
ment of a more effective CBR. 
Nothing has occurred in the program to date to suggest any changes in 
the basic recommendations of the A-108 (1) report which emphasized the neces-
sity for a strong research and development program coupled with vigorous 
testing and experimentation. 
In suggesting specific ways to achieve greater usefulness, it should be 
pointed out here that: 
1) Many of the reasons for low CBR effectiveness are associated with the 
physical configuration of the system. All of the problems of mobility, vulner-
ability and camouflage are those created primarily by equipment size and 
weight. Although the separated antenna system is somewhat smaller than the 
combined antenna system, a CBR much smaller than either of these arrangements 
CabLEUIEtinkL 
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is demanded by tactical considerations. A vigorous miniaturization program 
certainly holds promise of a superior system. 
2) Reliability has been shown to be sufficiently important to warrant 
provisions for preventive maintenance and for methods to give further 
increases in reliability during stand-by periods. 
3) Location effectiveness could be improved by providing the ability to 
acquire targets closer to the terrain mask, to extrapolate over greater periods 
of time, and to extrapolate trajectories that are seen for a shorter time. 
Operational efficiency could be improved by providing means for rapidly recog-
nizing and discriminating against mortar and rocket projectiles and artillery 
trajectories that are corrupted by multiple target interference. 
4) Development work should include attention to the design and testing 
of features which will give adaptability to camouflage, emplacement and pro-
tection. Particular attention should be given to the development and testing 
of radomes that have good camouflage characteristics. 
Submitted by: 
H. G. Dean, Jr. 
Project Director 
Approved: 
J. E. Boyd, Chief 
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ANNEX A. THE ARTILLERY ENVIRONMENT 
Inasmuch as a CBR is a tool to aid the artillery forces, its design 
and operation should be patterned by the mission of the artillery to be 
supported. However, it is not a simple matter to describe the artillery 
mission in specific terms. The advent of tactical atomic weapons NO 
produced a period of flux both in military organization and in the tactical 
concepts governing the employment of combat forces and their supporting 
elements such as counterbattery artillery. Because of these factors, it 
has not been possible to obtain more than broad generalizations concerning 
the battle environment which should be considered in designing a CBR. The 
artillery forces must tailor their operation primarily to accommodate the 
tactics of the infantry elements; until such time as the friendly and 
hostile infantry tactics become clear, it probably will not be possible to 
accurately describe the combat environment in a realistic manner. 
For analysis purposes, it is desirable to use an artillery environ- 
ment model; this was done in a previous study (Project A-108) *  utilizing 
concepts applicable to World War II. Although it was not possible to deter-
mine which new concepts should be applied to completely modernize the model, 
some of the more recent estimates of possible Soviet artillery usage made 
by personnel at Fort Sill were incorporated. 
Artillery Strength of Soviet Field Organizations. The recent study con- 
ducted by the Combat Development Department, Ft. Sill, includes an estimate 
of the artillery strength to be expected in a Soviet Field Army. The 
organization of the Soviet Field Army is indicated to be very similar to 
*Final Report, Project A-108 9 Operational Research Study for a Counter-
battery Radar, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1954 9 Secret. 
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that assumed .in the A-108 study; it includes an artillery division and 
three corps of two rifle divisions and one mechanized division each. 
Table A-1 is based on the Ft. Sill estimate and shows the numbers 
of artillery weapons that might be found in a Soviet Field Army. 
Table A-2 compares the Ft. Sill estimate and the A-108 study in 
the numbers of artillery weapons that might be on a division front if all 
the artillery in a Field Army were equally distributed along the front. 
The differences are slight and indicate that the same background material 
was applied in both areas. 
Weapon Distribution and Firepower. Ft. Sill estimates that weapon dis-
position will probably be essentially the same as that previously accepted 
for extended positional defense. The maximum tube density predicted at 
Ft. Sill is 125 tubes per 1000 yards of front. This figure, if assumed to 
include mortars, rocket launchers, and self-propelled guns, implies a 
minimum Soviet divisional frontage of about 3000 yards for a division slice 
of about 375 tubes (including mortars, etc.). This density was considered 
to be anextreme at Ft. Sill and therefore our model here should start with 
this figure as a maximum in calculating weapon densities. This disposition 
is generally comparable to the situations shown for "Hostile Defense" in 
the A-108 report. 
By reference to Figure 36 of the A-108 report it is possible to obtain 
estimates of weapon density for various divisional frontages. The recent 
Ft. Sill estimate of deployment in depth also corresponds to the estimates 
presented in Figure 37 of the A-108 report. The similarity in all respects 
is sufficient to warrant direct use of that portion of the A-108 material 
dealing with Soviet defensive situations. A tabulation of the number of 
batteries and firepower per 1000 yards of front for various frontages is 
given in Table A-3. 
The assumptions for combat organization and assignments of fire 
missions in the A-108 study appear to be valid in this application also 
since they are based on weapon capability and basic doctrine. The rates 
of fire used in the artillery model are, of course, those defined by 
TABLE A-1 
AN ESTIMATE OF TYPICAL SOVIET ARTILLERY STRENGTH 
TOWED FIELD 
ARTILLERY 
85 mm and 100 mm 
NUMBER OF TUBES IN SOVIET FIELD ARMY FRONT NUMBER OF TUBES IN SOVIET DIVISION FRONT 
Forward Zone Reinforcing Zone Total Forward Zone Reinforcing Zone Total 
Guns 312 312 52 52 
122 mm How 352 352 59 59 
122 mm Gun 64 64 11 11 
152 mm Gun/How 63 63 10 10 
152 mm How 64 64 11 11 
152 mm Gun 64 64 11 11 
203 mm Gun/How 48 48 8 8 
- _ 
664 303 967 162 Total Tubes 111 51 
Total Batteries 
(average of 4 
tubesbattery) 
166 76 242 28 13 41 
Mortars and Other 
Weapons (Does Not 
Include Anti-tank, 
Tank or AAA): 
82 mm Mortar 786 786 131 131 
120 mm Mortar 270 270 45 45 
160 mm Mortar 72 72 12 12 
300 mm Mortar 32 32 5 5 
132 mm FUL. 36 36 6 6 
85 mm S.F. Gun 108 108 18 18 
Total Tubes 1268 36 1304 211 6 217 
TABLE A-2. Comparison of Estimates of Soviet Artillery Strength 
in a Soviet Division Front. 







76 	mm, 85 mm or 
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Total Light Artillery 122 130 8 tubes 
152 mm Gun/How 10 21 
152 mm How 11 10 
152 mm Gun 11 
203 mm Gun/How 8 8 
Total, Medium and 
Heavy Artillery 2 
Total Towed 
Artillery (tubes) 162 172 10 
Total Towed 
Artillery (batteries 
of 4 tubes) 40 1/2 13 2 1/2 
TABLE A-3. Estimated Battery Density and Firepower 









per 1000 yds 
of front.  
Max. Rate 
of Fire per 




Rate of Fire 
per 1000 yds 
of front 
lrounds/min.)  
       
6,000 yds 3,000 yds 13 600 75 
10,000 5 9 000 9 400 50 
20,000 10,000 4 to 5 200 3o 
30,000 15,000 3 140 20 
40,000 20,000 2 6o 10 
weapon characteristics. In practice, these maximum rates could be expected 
at times during important situations if the ammunition is available at the 
weapons. Lesser rates could be expected frequently and these can always 
be expressed as percentages of the maximum rates to adapt the model to the 
particular situation desired. 
The Artillery Environement as Seen by the Radar. Only a fraction of the 
trajectories fired by the hostile artillery complex will be visible to a 
CBR. Estimates of what a CBR might see were made in the course of Project 
A-108, based on the model distribution in depth and likely fire missions of 
towed artillery. (Weapons used in a direct-fire role, perhaps 20 to 30 
per cent of all artillery, were excluded because their trajectories are 
expected to be completely masked.) The results of this analysis appear to 
be generally applicable to the revised artillery model, and are summarized 
in Table A-4. The percentages listed indicate how many projectiles, of all 
those fired within a rectangular slice of enemy territory extending back 
11,000 yards from the zone of contact (Z/C), are expected to rise above the 
mask. Here it is assumed that weapons of various types fire at rates propor-
tional to their maximum sustained rates of fire. Figures are given for two 
opposite extreme cases: first, where all weapons carry out their assigned 
missions using the maximum possible charges (condition for worst visibility); 
and second, where all weapons use the minimum possible charges (condition 
for best visibility). The mask angles considered are the total mask, the 
sum of the terrain mask and the additional amount by which the radar beam 
must be elevated to clear the terrain. 
Of the trajectories which are visible, not all will be suitable for 
successful extrapolation. For the presently proposed AN/TPQ-5, a "usable" 
trajectory is defined by the following criteria: (1) the projectile must 
be visible long enough for the radar to obtain six to eight seconds of smooth 
tracking, and (2) for accurate location, the time of flight to the midpoint 
of the tracked interval must not exceed ten seconds. Again the results of 
the A-108 study apply. Table A-5 shows an estimate of how many trajectories 
satisfy these conditions. 
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TABLE A-4. Estimate of Percentage of Trajectories 
Visible to Service Test Model CBR. 
Radar Location from Zone of Contact) 
4,000 yds. 	 6,000 yds.  
Mask Angle Max. charge Min. charge Max. charge Min. charge 
50 mils 45 °/0 54 0/0 20 0/o 54 °/0 
100 mils 20 45' 6 33 
150 mils 6 30 4 20 
TABLE A-5. Estimate of Percentage of Trajectories that 
are Useable by Service Test Model CBR. 
Radar Location (from Zone of Contact)  
4,000 yds. 	 6,000 yds.  
Mask Angle Max. charge Min. charge Max. charge Min. charge 
50 mils 20 °/0 54 °/0 6 °A) 45 °/0 
loo mils 4 17 b 4 
150 mils 1 2 0 0 
These results can be extended to show what a CBR might see within a 
single wedge-shaped search sector. Table A-6 summarizes the situation for 
a radar 4000 yards behind the Z/C, with a 30 0 search sector. The first two 
columns show how sources of fire within the sector are distributed in 
depth. The remaining columns show the visible and usable percentages of 
total sector fire contributed by each class of artillery. The latter 
figures can also be expressed as percentages of total visible fire s as in 
Table A-7. 
TABLE A-6 
MODEL CLASSIFICATION OF FIRE FROM SOURCES WITHIN A RADAR SEARCH SECTOR 
Distance from Radar to Zone of Contact = 4000 yards 
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5 to 8 
Medium 





























Totals 100.0 57.4 47.0 48.6 22.9 57.4 22.9 20.8 5.4 
TABLE A-7 
MODEL CLASSIFICATION OF VISIBLE flJ'E WITHIN A RADAR SEARCH SECTOR 
Distance from Radar to Zone of Contact = 4000 yards 
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ANNEX B. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The physical environment of a military system may be thought of as the col-
lection of environmental elements that are not produced by combat activities. 
Thus the so-called physical environment includes factors such as the landform, 
the vegetative cover, the soil structure and composition,.the weather, the net-
work of roads existing prior to the military engagement, and other similar 
elements. The physical environment therefore is to be distinguished from the 
combat environment which is composed of elements produced specifically by com-
bat activities. 
If a precise quantitative description of the physical environment could be 
constructed from maps, aerial photographs, geological data, and other data, then 
the problems of operational analysis and system design would be greatly simpli-
fied. Unfortunately, however, no complete analytical framework exists for 
studying the effects of physical environment during the design phase of military 
equipment. Some impressive steps have been taken in this direction, notably by 
Dr. L. C. Peltier of the U.S. Geological Survey, but there remain many gaps in 
the quantitative description of the physical environment. Elements of the 
physical environment such as micro-relief (e.g., local irregularities in the 
terrain such as ditches, boulders, etc.), vegetative cover, and distributions of 
soil types have not been studied with a view toward systems-design and opera-
tional analysis. Personal judgment and experience must be relied on in asses-
sing these factors. On the other hand, the elements of landform, weather, and 
the relation between soil strength and trafficability have been analysed and 
studied in such a way that quantitative data are available for analysis. The 
following sections of this Annex will describe these data and the methods by 
which the data were obtained. 
. 1. The Landform Analysis. A most useful method for classifying and analysing 
landforms has been developed by Peltiert at the U. S. Geological Survey. The 
Peltier, L. C., Terrain Com onents in Operational Research, Military Geology 
Department, U. S. Geological Survey, unpublished. ,See also Final Report, 
Project A-108, 0 erational Research Study for a Counterbattery Radar, Georgia 
Institute of Technology, 195 , Secret. 
starting point for Peltier's investigation is the definition of a measure of 
landform structure that is easily obtained from contour maps and which correlates 
well with the many characteristics of landform that are important in operational 
analysis and system-design. Such a measure is the so-called local relief. The 
local relief is defined as the maximum difference in elevation of two points 
within a one-mile square. A given map, or section of a map, may be said to 
represent homogeneous terrain if the variation in local relief is small for all 
the one-mile squares that cover the area under consideration. Once certain 
areas of homogeneous terrain have been established, other characteristics of 
the landform may be measured in these areas. Peltier found that the mean local 
relief for a homogeneous area correlated well with measured values relating_to 
many other landform properties. For example the mean local relief has been 
correlated with the following landform properties among others: 
Distance across valleys 
Height of valley walls 
Mean slope 
Number of drainageways per mile 
Extent of visibility 
Thus an estimate of the above quantities for a given area may be obtained easily 
by measuring the mean local relief and using the empirical results which describe 
the correlation. Regions in which a transition takes place from one roughly 
homogeneous terrain to another cannot be handled in this way, of course. Such 
transition regions must be studied separately, and the landform properties must 
be measured directly on specific maps. If necessary, the analysis could be 
extended to cover a set of typical transition regions, but this problem has not 
yet received much attention. 
Peltier has organized homogeneous terrain samples into classes numbered one 
through nine and each of these classes has been given a descriptive title. Table 
B-1 shows this classification system. As can be seen, the lower boundary of the 





Here B is the value of the lower boundary and N is the class number. A linear 
relationship between class number and class boundaries was found to be less 
rFieftfrift.--  
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Low Mountains 	 6 
Mountains 	 7 
High Mountains 	 8 








satisfactory because a very large proportion of the interesting landform types 
were relatively flat. This resulted in either most of the interesting terrain 
samples falling into the first few classes or, if the interval was made smaller, 
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160-319 
Contour maps that provided typical examples of six of these classes were 
used in the study of landform characteristics important to the CBR problem. 
These maps and the class they represent are shown in Table B-2. 
TABLE B-2 
EXAMPTES OF HOMOGENEOUS TERRAIN TYPES 1 	2% Local Relief 	) 
Example(USGS Quadranf4e Maps) Class No, Landform Class Mean Std. dev. 
Chocowinity, North Carolina 1 Flatlands 13 8.7 
Millen, Georgia 3 Plains 70 20 
Marble Hill, Missouri  5 Hills 176 1 7 
Mannington, West Virginia 6 Low Mountains 468 58 .9 
Klondyke, Arizona 7 Mountains 850 310 
Montezuma, Colorado 8 High Mountains 1648 4o0 
In the CBR problem it is most important to determine measures of the 
following quantities from a landform analysis: (1) the visibility of initial 
portions of the enemy trajectories, (2) the distribution of ground slopes, and 
(3) the distance across valleys. Measures of each of these three quantities 
have been defined, and numerical values have been obtained by sampling on each 
of the homogeneous terrain maps listed in Table B-2. 
The visibility analysis was performed by simulating on the maps the select-
ion of a radar site subject to realistic constraints. First, a point was chosen 
at random on a map and a square, one mile on a side, was drawn with its center 
on the randomly selected point. Second, a direction was selected at random and 
a radar site chosen within the one-mile square to give maximum visibility in the 
randomly selected direction (termed the principal direction). Once the radar 
site was selected in this manner, the following quantities were measured: 
Mask Angle - The angle subtended by some hill or ridge obstruction when viewed 
from the radar antenna. See Figure B-1. The radar antenna was assumed to be 
at a height of 15 feet above the ground. 
Radar Site 
Figure B-1. The Mask Angle. The angles m1 and m2 are the mask angles of the 
first and second hills respectively. 
Optimized Mask Angle - The mask angle of some hill or ridge when viewed along 
the principal direction. 
Mean Optimized Mask Angle - The average of the optimized mask angles of hills 
found on the transect from 1000 to 600o yards from the radar site. 
Greatest Optimized Mask Angle - The largest of the optimized mask angles of 
hills found on the transect from 1000 to 6000 yards from the point of origin. 
The values for these quantities as determined by the sampling procedure 
are given in Table B-3. The number of sites used on each map was 6 to 10. 
Table B-3 





















Montezuma, High mountains 5.03 6.45 7.74 8 Mean 
Colorado 2.60 3.05 3.16 Standard dev. 
Klondyke, Mountains 1.796 3.84 5.54 7 Mean 
Arizona 1.72 2.12 2.19 Standard dev. 
Mannington, Low mountains 1.422 3.25 3.71 6 Mean 
West Virginia .83 1.09 1.52 Standard dev, 
Marble Hill, Hills .638 1.27 1.41 8 Mean 
Missouri .56 .79 .89 Standard dev. 
Millen, Plains .155 .27 .44 10 Mean 
Georgia .108 .10 .18 Standard dev. 
Chocowinity, Flatlands .037 .06 .09 10 Mean 
North Carolina .o4 .06 .05 Standard dev. 
Note that the various types of mask angles increase uniformly with the mean 
local relief. Also note that the greatest mask angle in a 30° sector is not 
very different from the greatest optimum mask angle, indicating that the sites 
give good visibility within the 30° sector centered on the principal direction. 
The distribution of ground slopes was also found by a sampling procedure. 
The slope was measured at a regular pattern of points formed by the intersec-
tions of north-south lines and east-west lines spaced one mile apart. This 
gave about 220 points on each map. The slope was measured by finding the mini-
mum spacing between contour lines in the neighborhood of the point and dividing 
by the elevation difference indicated by the two contour lines. The resulting 
slope distributions for each of the six representative maps are shown in Figures 
B-2 and B-3. 
The distances across valleys were obtained by sampling the distance from 
one high point to the next adjacent high point on randomly placed straight lines. 
The results of these measurements are shown in Table B-4. These distributions 
are broad as evidenced by the large values of the standard deviation and skewed 
as evidenced by the deviation between the mode and the median values. 
TABTF B-4 
RESULTS OF VALLEY WIDTH STUDY 
Terrain Sample Landform Class 
Width of Valleys (feet) 	 7 
Mean Median 1 	Mode Std. Deviation 
Montezuma, Colorado High Mountains 3250 2200 1500 2300 
Klondyke, Arizona Mountains 1840 1400 1050 1330 
Mannington, West Va. Low Mountains 2390 2100 1900 1300 
Marble Hill, Missouri Hills 2800 21i-00 2 1 -00 1650 
Millen, Georgia Plains 4110 3350 3500 2770 
Chocowinity, N. C. Flatlands 4670 4350 3500 2380 
2. Weather The Distribution of Precipitation. The weather is an important 
element in the environment of a radar system such as the AN/TPQ-5( ). This 
system is particularly vulnerable to spurious echoes caused by precipitation 
because it must be designed to detect and track a very small radar target at 
long ranges It has been recognized for some time that precipitation, includ-
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Figure B-2. Distribution of Point Slope Measurements in Per Cent Slope for 
Chocowinity, North Carolina; Millen, Georgia; and Marble Hill, 
Missouri. 
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Figure B-3. Distribution of Point Slope Measurements in Per Cent Slope for 
Mannington, West Virginia; Klondyke, Arizona; and Montezuma, 
Colorado. 
analysis of the effect of precipitation on the XE-1 has been presented earlier.
t 
This analysis confirmed the results of unpublished studies by the General Elec-
tric Co. The situation may be summarized by saying that a radar system such as 
the AN/TPQ-5( ), operating on X-band, may be expected to be almost completely 
useless at any precipitation rate, even a light drizzle or a light snowfall. 
Field experience with the XE-1 thus far supports this conclusion. 
The weather environment of this radar system, insofar as precipitation is 
concerned, will therefore be extremely important in determining the usefulness 
of the system. For this reason, the assistance of the Air Weather Service was 
sought to determine as much information as possible about the frequency of 
occurrence of precipitation on a worldwide basis. To evaluate the seriousness 
of the precipitation problem, one would like to know for each part of the world 
the fraction of time that precipitation occurs during each month of the year. 
Unfortunately, the percentage of time that precipitation occurs has not been 
measured directly on anything approaching a world-wide basis. Consequently, it 
was necessary for the Air Weather Service to perform some degree of objective 
and subjective manipulation on the available data in order to arrive at an 
estimate of the distribution of precipitation frequency. In general, precipi-
tation data were taken from two main sources: summarized data from U. S. Air 
Force stations in the United States and overseas and from various foreign 
publications. USAF data are summarized in per cent frequency, by months, of 
hourly observations reporting precipitation. Data from foreign sources 
are more often than not published in such a form that considerable interpola-
tion is required to obtain a per cent-occurence figure. The length of record 
for most of the data varies from 5 to more than 20 years. 
Estimates were made for areas where precipitation data is completely 
lacking. These estimates were based on (a) comparison with analogous areas 
where data were available, (b) personal knowledge, and (c) various theoretical 
considerations. Estimates were furthermore necessary when the available data 
were inadequate. However, in spite of the margin of error in these estimates, 
t
See Semi-Annual Report, Project A--190, Operational Analysis for a Counterbattery 
Radar, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1955, Secret. 
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the distributions of precipitation frequency prepared by the Air Weather Service 
provide a basis for future evaluation which is enormously better than the "off-
the-cuff" judgments that would otherwise be required. 
As a supplement to the maps prepared for us by the Air Weather Service, a 
brief report on their study was also submitted. This report provides a good 
introduction to the maps as well as some valuable guides to interpretation. The 
report and the distribution maps have been reproduced in full in the next sec-
tion of this document. 
Monthly Percentage Frequency of Precipitation (Prepared by: Headquarters, 
Air Weather Service, Directorate of Climatology, United States Air Force) 
Preface 
"This report has been prepared in answer to a request from the Georgia 
Institute of Technology, Engineering Experiment Station for information on the 
frequency of precipitation, by seasons, on a global basis. The Institute 
requires this information in connection with an operational research problem 
on which it is working for the Signal Corps under Contract No. DA-36-039 S0-64562." 
"World-wide charts showing the estimated distribution of precipitation fre-
quency are shown in Figures B-4 1 B-5, B-6, and B-7. Each figure represents a 
different.season. These charts were prepared on a limited time schedule from 
immediately available data. They suffer from the scanty data at hand since most 
precipitation data are not in the form that allows presentation in per cent of 
time. The data over the world are in number of inches and/or number of days 
that precipitation occurred. A day of precipitation could be defined as a day 
that had one-hundredth inch of rain during any period of time, even less than 
an hour. Data of this nature are not, therefore, readily converted into per-
centage." 
"The observed greatest mean frequency of precipitation (i.e., the greatest 
per cent of observations with precipitation) is given by the black numbers. The 
letter subscript designates the month of the season in which this frequency 
occurred. The red numbers represent the mean monthly frequency of precipitation 
for the season from factors other than observed data. In some instances a let-
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"Data on the frequency of various intensities of precipitation are unavail-
able. However, a few general statements can be made about the frequency of in-
tensities on a global scale. Precipitation in the Arctic is light to very light, 
with most stations reporting less than an inch (water equivalent) per month even 
though precipitation occurs 40 per cent of the time. In the mid-latitudes dur-
ing the winter, spring, and autumn most precipitation is light. For example 
at Kimberly, Union of South Africa, five-sixths of the rain that falls during 
the entire year is termed light. Moderate and heavy precipitation occur only 
for short periods of time, mainly in late spring and early autumn. Summer pre-
cipitation is usually moderate to heavy, falling mainly in showers. However, 
coastal areas, such as western Europe, still have considerable light rain in 
the summer." 
"Heavy precipitation occurs most frequently in the Tropics from 20 °N to 
20° S latitude. Areas where the monsoon is common, such as India, Indonesia and 
the Gold Coast of Africa, a more steady type of precipitation is noticeable, 
with light to moderate rain being more noticeable. This is interrupted occasion-
ally with heavier showers." 
"Precipitation may differ greatly from place to place (even few miles), 
month to month and year to year throughout the world. Wind and terrain, such 
as hills and mountain ranges, have tremendous effect on the amount of clouds 
and precipitation in very short distances. Therefore, the use of isolines or 
shading to designate equal areas is not advisable. Interpolation or extrapola-
tion for other purposes than those intended is not recommended," 
"This report has been prepared by the Directorate of Climatology, Hq. AWS 
and will not be reproduced or used for purposes or interpretations other than 
those intended without concurrence." 
3. Trafficability. Trafficability may be defined as the ability of vehicles 
tb move from one point to another through a given environment. Soils traffic-
ability concerns the specific effect of soils on movement. Information on this 
subject used in this report comes principally from the Waterways Experiment 
Station of the U.S. Corps of Engineers through discussions, correspondence, and 
a report being prepared there for the Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 




The Waterways Experiment Station has divided its investigations of soils 
trafficability into two phases: (1) the development of instruments and methods 
for determining trafficability by ground reconnaissance parties, and (2) the 
development of methods for predicting trafficability from soils and weather data 
without physical tests. The results of phase (1) of this investigation were 
taken up in the report Soils Trafficability and will be discussed further in 
this section. 
The factors influencing soil trafficability may be divided into two classes: 
(1) those which are permanently associated with a given soil type and locality 
and (2) those which change with the weather. Factors such as soil type, slope, 
and amount and type of vegetation may be recorded for future reference for a 
given piece of terrain although the last factor mentioned may vary somewhat with 
weather and season. Factors which vary with weather are the amount and location 
of water in the soil, temperature, wind velocity, solar radiation, humidity, 
cloudiness, etc. 
As a first approach to the problem of making a long range prediction as 
to the trafficability of a piece of terrain, the terrain may be examined under 
varying conditions and classified as follows: 
Terrain Class Dry Wet 
1 Passable Passable 
2 Passable Doubtful 
3 Passable Impassable 
4 Doubtful Impassable 
5 Impassable Impassable 
The numbers in the column "Terrain Class" refer to terrain having definite soil 
types and slopes, and the adjectives "Passable," "Doubtful," and "Impassable" 
refer to movements of some specific type of vehicle. The terms "Dry" and "Wet" 
are ambiguous to a degree since a given amount of water may be distributed in 
the soil in several different manners depending on the weather history. The 
selection of the adjectives "Dry" and "Wet" is dictated by the strong effect of 
soil moisture on trafficability. For a given moisture content the terrain may 
be mapped into zones according to terrain classification number. These zones 
will of course depend on the type of vehicle under consideration. 
Considering the complexity of the trafficability problem, it is easy to 
understand why phase (2) which involves predictions of trafficability, is not 
yet sufficiently well developed for use in the present problem. Phase (1), 
however, provides a most useful method of comparing various trailer designs 
and tractor types in combination. This comparison is possible only on a rela-
tive basis as will be seen. 
It is necessary first of all to define some measures of soil strength. 
Two characteristics of a soil are of great interest: (1) the ability of a 
soil to support a vehicle (not permit it to sink) and (2) the ability of a 
soil to withstand the shearing stress of a vehicle in motion. If one makes 
due allowances for vehicle characteristics, the so-called cone index gives a 
convenient standard for comparing the strengths of various soils. The cone 
index of a soil is the resistance of the soil to the penetration of a standard 
cone in pounds per square inch of cone base. This index is usually given with 
units omitted. The details of the cone index measurement are given later in 
this section. 
A soil that is subjected to continuous mechanical mixing or agitation 
changes its cone index so that it approaches some new value as the agitation 
proceeds. A soil that has been changed in this way is said to be remolded. It 
is assumed that 40 to 50 passes by some heavy vehicle are sufficient to cause 
the complete remolding of a soil, although most soils are completely remolded 
by a much smaller number of passes. Agitation or remolding of a soil almost 
always weakens it. The measure of this effect to be used here is the remolding  
index which is the ratio of the cone index of the completely remolded soil to 
the soil's original cone index. 
The characteristics under heavy traffic are of considerable interest. The 
measure of soil strength under this condition is the so-called rating cone 
index which is the product of the cone index and the remolding index. 
None of the above parameters have depended on the characteristics of the 
particular type of vehicle being studied. In determining the trafficability 
of a piece of terrain with respect to a particular vehicle one calculates a 
CONFMEATTAr 
parameter called the vehicle cone index. This parameter is associated with a 
giventype of vehicle and indicates the minimum soil strength in terms of rating 
cone index for 40 to 50 passes of that vehicle. A rating cone index of about 
75 per cent of this value is adequate for a single pass. The towing force 
delivered and the per cent slope negotiable by a given vehicle may be deter-
mined for various values of I, the rating cone index and I v, the vehicle cone 
index. Figure B-8 shows the relationships between these quantities. The vehi-
cle cone index Iv may be determined by means of Figure B-10, if one uses an 
empirically determined number called the mobility index. The vehicle cone in-
dices and mobility indices for most Army vehicles are obtainable directly from 
the appendix of the report Soils Trafficability. The mobility indices of vehi- 
cles not give there were determined by means of the following empirical formulae: 
Mobility Index may be computed in the case of wheeled trailers as follows: 
W 
Im = .64 c + Wa - C) + 10 
where 
P
c = 1/2 tire pressure, 
W = 1.0 for 15000 lb/axle or greater, 
. 9 for 12500 -14999 lb/axle, 
.8 for 10000-12499 lb/axle, 
.7 for 7500 -9999 lb/axle, 




100 tire width in inches for a single tire, -  
1.5 --- tire width in inches for a dual tire, 100 
Wa 1000 axle load in pounds, and -  
C = clearance in inches. 
For self-propelled tracked vehicles the following empirical formula applies: 
W 
Im = 7--- +B 10) E F 
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Figure B-8. Maximum Towing Force in Pounds that can be Developed on Level 
Ground and Maximum Slope that can be Climbed for Various Values 
of the Quantity I c  -I v
. 
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Figure B -10. Mobility Index Versus Vehicle Cone Index. 
1, 1 gross weight in pounds  
c area of track in contact with ground 
W = 1.8 for 100000 lb or more 
1.4 for 70000 - 99999 lb 
1.2 for 50000 - 69999 lb 
1.0 for less than 50000 lb 
T = 100 track width in inches 
G = 1.0 for grousers less than 1.5 in. high 
1.1 for grousers more than 1.5 in. high 
B = 	 10 
gross weight in pounds 
(No. of bogies on tracks in contact with ground) x (area of one track shoe 
in squnre inches) 
C = clearance in inches 
E = 1.00 for 10 hp per ton or greater 
1.05 for less than 10 hp per ton 
F = transmission factor = 1.00 for hydraulic 
1.05 for mechanical 
Soil strength is measured by a device called a cone penetrometer which 
consists of a 30-degree cone of 1/2-square-inch base, a proving ring ) a dial 
gauge, and a handle. As the cone is forced into the ground the proving ring 
is deformed by an amount that is proportional to the force on the cone. This 
deformation is read on the gauge. The gauge is read at intervals of 6 inches 
as the operator forces the cone into the ground to a depth of about 24 inches, 
being careful to insure a uniform rate of penetration. For soil layers critical 
to the vehicles considered here, the gauge readings at 6 and 12 inches below 
the surface are averaged and the result is called the cone index. It has been 
found that if 15 sets of readings are taken within a radius of three feet in 
homogeneous appearing ground, another set of readings will not appreciably 
change the average. If the cone index is above 150 or below 30, fewer readings 
are necessary since ordinary inaccuracies in the readings are not enough to 
change the trafficability estimate of the soil by an important amount. 
Equipment for making a remolding test consists of a hollow cylinder 9 
inches long and 2 inches in diameter, a 2-1/2 pound drop hammer, a cone pene-
trometer, and a soil sampler, which is a device used to cut a cylindrically-
shaped core sample out of the ground and place it in the 9-inch cylinder. The 
remolding test is accomplished by reading the cone index as the base of the 
cone enters the soil sample and after each inch of penetration to a depth of 
4 inches. Next, 100 blows are delivered to the sample from a height of 12 
inches with the drop hammer. The penetration test is then repeated. The 
remolding index is the ratio of the sum of five penetration tests before to the 
sum of five penetration tests after remolding. 
In the investigation of an area, enough locations are selected to insure 
the uniformity of the area and three or four sets of penetrometer readings are 
made at each location. Remolding tests are made at each location unless, after 
the first two or three, the remolding index is found to be .90 or more. 
The application of these methods is appropriate to fine grained soils only. 
Sand offers good support at low cone indices especially if wet, whereas the 
strength of fine grained soils usually decreases sharply with an increase in 
moisture content. Trafficability studies have not yet progressed to the point 
where one can determine the distributions of cone indices and moisture content 
over any large geographic areas or relate cone index to soil type. 
The heaviest pieces of equipment to be moved by CBR units are the antenna 
systems either for separated or combined systems. Attention is therefore con-
centrated in this section on the ability of these antenna systems, mounted on 
trailers or truck beds, to be moved from one point to another since this imposes 
the mobility limitation on the unit as a whole. In order to compare the abil-
ities of various prime mover-trailer combinations,, curves were plotted to show 
the maximum slope negotiable versus rating cone index. These curves are given 
in Figures B-11 through B-16. In the preparation of these curves, combinations 
of four different prime movers and three different trailers were considered. 
The mobility and vehicle indices for the vehicles were found in the Appendix 
of Soils Trafficability, except for the two- and four-wheeled trailers and the 
M5A3 tractor. The data for the trailers were taken from the proposed layouts 
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Figure B-11. Maximum Negotiable Slope Versus Rating Cone Index for a Single Pass and for Prime- 
movers Drawing Two-wheeled Antenna Trailers for the Separate System. 
TRACTOR (M5A3) S(2W) 
TRUCK (21/2 T[M35]) - S)2W) 
TRUCK (6T) - S(2W) 
TRUCK (4T) - 5(2W) 
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Figure B-12. Maximum Negotiable Slope Versus Rating Cone Index for Multiple Passes and for Prime-
movers Drawing Two-wheeled Antenna Trailers for the Separate System. 
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Figure B-13. Maximum Negotiable Slope Versus Rating Cone Index for a Single Pass and for Prime- 
movers Drawing Four-wheeled Antenna Trailers for the Combined System. Also Curves 
are Shown for the Tractor M5A3 and the 6-ton Truck Drawing the Tracked Antenna Trailer 
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Figure B-14. Maximum Negotiable Slope Versus Rating Cone Index for Multiple Passes and for Prime-
movers Drawing Four-wheeled Trailers with the Combined Antenna System. Also Curves 
are Shown for the Tractor M5A3 and the 6-ton Truck Drawing the Tracked Antenna Trailer 
for the Combined System. 
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Figure B-15. Maximum Negotiable Slope Versus Rating Cone Index for the Best Separate and Best 
Combined System Antenna Trailers Using Wheeled Prime-movers for Single and Multiple 





































TRUCK (6T) - S (2W) SINGLE PASS 
--4111 	 - -- -lb- 	— --• 	- 0  
TRUCK (6T) - C (Tr) MULTIPLE PASS 
TRUCK (6T) - C(Tr) SINGLE PASS 
AR' 
TRUCK (6T) - S(2W) MULTIPLE PASS 
z 
• 
















--0 TRACTOR (M5A3) — C (Tr) SINGLE PASS 
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Figure B-16. Maximum Negotiable Slope Versus Rating Cone Index for the Best Separate and the Best 
Combined System Antenna Trailers Using Tracked Prime-movers for Single and Multiple 
Passes: Tractor (M5A3) + 2-wheeled Trailer. Tractor (M5A3) + Tracked Trailer. 
colVFMtirrrat 
obtained from TM 9-2800-1, February 1953. These curves represent the best 
possible performance that can be expected in each case considered. .Poor driv-
ing technique, unexpected soft spots, slipperiness, etc. could cause the 
vehicles to become immobilized even under the specified conditions. A tabula-
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(lb) (lb) (lb) (lb) 
1. Truck, cargo, 	59 17,800  5,000 231 10,000 6,000 
2-1/2 ton, 6x6, 
M35, w/winch 
2. No. 1 above w/o 
winch carrying: 
Search system 	60 18,465 5,000 231 10,000 6,000 
Track system 58 17,065 5,000 231 10,000 6,000 
3. Truck, cargo, 	73 26,800 8,350 2116 25,000 11,000 
4 ton, 6x6, 
w/winch 
4. Truck, cargo, 4 ton, 
6x6, Dia T, Mod 968A, 
w/o winch carrying: 
Search system 	68 23,200 8,350 243 25,000 11,000 
Track system 65 21,800 8,350 243 25,000 11,000 
5. Truck, prime 	73 
mover, and cargo, 
34,900t 12,000 277 40,000 20,000 
6 ton, 6x6, w/winch 
6. Tractor, high 	58 
speed, 13 ton,M5A3 
30,350t 127 20,000 20,000 
7. Trailer, cargo, 	61- 20 1 540t 12 0 000 147 
6 ton, tracked 
(Athey type) 
8. Trailer, 4 dual 	66 
wheels, 9x20 tires 
20,000t 
9. Trailer, 2 dual 	66 
wheels, 9x20 tires 
10,000
t 




Columns VI and VII give the maximum recommended weight of the towed load 
under the worst conditions, the limiting factor being the mechanical capacity 
of the prime mover. The figures came from TM 9-2800-1 and were presumably 
based on experience and/or the manufacturers' recommendations. No method for 
obtaining this data was given. 
The curves to be presented here represent the limitation imposed by the 
load bearing capacity of the soil on various combinations of vehicles. The 
data used in computing the mobility index for the 2- and 4-wheeled trailers 
are as follows: 
Tire Total Tire Axle 
Pressure Weight Width Clearance 
(in psi) (in lb) (in inches) (in inches) 
Trailer, 2-wheeled 45 10,000 13.5 16.5 
Trailer, 4-wheeled 45 20,000 13.5 16.5 
The force T
2 
necessary to tow the trailers for corresponding values of I
c 
was determined from the graphs in Figure B-9. The maximum negotiable slope is 










1 and W2 
are the weights in pounds of the prime mover and trailer res-
pectively and T1 is the towing force in pounds delivered by the prime mover. 
S is plotted against I c giving the graphs in Figures B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, 
B-15 and B-16. In plotting the curves for a single pass, vehicle cone indices 
were assumed to be 75 per cent of their normal or multiple pass value. 
The meaning of the symbols used on these curves are as follows: 
S = the separate antenna system (2-wheeled trailers) 
C = the combined antenna system (tracked or 4-wheeled trailers) 
2-1/2 T = the 2-1/2 ton truck M35 given as item (1) in Table B-5 
Tr = tracked trailer 
Tr(M5A3) = the tracked tractor 
Example: (2-1/2T[M35]) - S(2W) = a 2-1/2 ton truck type M35 towing a 2-wheeled 
antenna trailer for the separated system. 
Consider first the choice between a combined antenna system, where the 
search and track radars use the same antenna mount on the 4-wheeled or tracked 
trailers, and the separated antenna systems, where the search and track radars 
are on separate 2-wheeled trailers. Examination of Figures B-15 and B-16 
reveals that the separated system, using the 2-wheeled trailers, is clearly 
preferable for every prime mover except at cone indices below 70 where the 
difference is slight. 
-The tracked tractor M5A3 offers the best choice of prime mover for off-. 
road operation for all rating cone indices and offers special advantages in 
soft soil (low cone indices) as Figures B-12, B-14, B-15, and B-16 show. The 
6-ton truck is the best wheeled prime mover, but it offers only a very small 
advantage over the 2-1/2- and 4-ton trucks at lower cone indices as Figures 
B-11 0 B-12, B-13, and B-14 show. For a single pass over soil of cone index 
100, the 6-ton truck can pull the two-wheeled trailers up slopes of 32.3 per 
cent as opposed to 29.2 per cent and 25.7 per cent for the 4- and 2-1/2-ton 
trucks. In a choice between the M5A3 and the 6-ton truck, the M5A3 has a 
considerable advantage in soft ground and a slight advantage at higher cone 
indices. .The tractor M5A3 can be expected to have a considerable advantage 
in negotiating micro-relief obstacles (ditches, boulders, fallen trees, etc.), 
but at the same time the disturbance produced by a tracked vehicle will pro-
duce camouflage difficulties. Thus it appears clear that the trailers, regard-
less of type, should be designed to be towed either by a. truck or a tracked 
tractor depending on the trafficability difficulties that will be encountered. 
The possibility of having the search and track systems mounted directly 
on truck beds was also investigated although it is felt that this arrangement 
had special disadvantages: high silhouette, high center of gravity, possibility 
of having truck deadlined, etc. Items (2) and (Ii) in Table B-5, graphs in 
Figures B-17 and B-18, and columns (Ii) and (5) in Tables B-6 and B-7 pertain 
to this arrangement. 
Complete tabulations for all systems of the rating cone index allowing 
motion on level ground and the maximum slope negotiable at rating cone index 
100 are given in Tables B-6 and B•7 respectively. The graphs in Figures B-11, 
B-12, B-13 1 B-14, B-15, B-16, B-17, and B-18 give the curves from which these . 
values were determined and may be used to get other values, 
TABLE B-6 

















Truck, 2-1/2 ton ---- 66.3 55.4 44.0 45.0 Single 
---- 77.0 68.1 58.0 60.o Multiple 
Truck, 4 ton ---- 69.7 61.6 49.0 51.0 Single 
---- 84.2 78.0 65.0 68.0 Multiple 
Truck, 6 ton 57.5 66.1 60.0 ---- ---- Single 
74.8 81.5 77.0 ---- ---- Multiple 
Tractor, M5A3 47.4 56.5 49.5 ---- ---- Single 
60.2 68.1 62.5 ---- ---- Multiple 
TABLE B-7 

















Truck, 2-1/2 ton ---- 14.2 25.7 50,1 49.8 Single 
---- 11.9 22,5 45.5 44.6 Multiple 
Truck, 4 ton ---- 18.1 29.2 48.7 48.o Single 
---- 12.1 21.7 42.0 40.3 Multiple 
Truck, 6 ton 27.6 22.3 32.3 ---- ---- Single 
21.4 15.8 24.4 ---- ---- Multiple 
Tractor, M5A3 33.7 28.0 40.4 ---- ---- Single 
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Figure B-17. Maximum Negotiable Slope Versus Rating Cone Index for the 2-1/2-ton Truck (M35) Mounting 
Either the Separate Track or Search System for Both Single and Multiple Passes. 
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Figure B-18. Maximum Negotiable Slope Versus Rating Cone Index for the 4-ton Truck (Model 968A) 
Mounting Either the Separate Track or Search System for Both Single and 
Multiple Passes. 
ANNEX C. SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
Introduction. In a recent study of the military characteristics of a counter-
battery radar made by the Combat Development Department at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 
a requirement is stated in regards to reliability that the system should be 
capable of "23 hours continuous operation out of 2 1i hours, withoutexcesSive 
breakdown:" Although "without excessive breakdown" is open to interpretation, 
it definitely implies that a high degree of reliability is desired by the mili-
tary. 
The critical nature of this requirement was discussed in an earlier study t in 
which the reliability of the AN/TPQ-5( ) was inferred from an analysis of field 
maintenance data on the M-33 radar, a similar type system of approximately the 
same size. This study gives the following estimates of the probabilities of the 
AN/TPQ-5( ) radar surviving missions of varying lengths, based on a total tube 
count of 1200. 
Length of Mission (hours) 2 4 8 12 24 
Probability . of Survival 0.78 0.60 0.37 0.22 0.05 
Regardless of the interpretation of the above phrase, "without excessive break-
down) " these mission survival probabilities are too low.. Special efforts must 
therefore be made to build reliability into the equipment if an acceptable CBR 
system is to be developed. 
The AN/TPQ-5( ) radar system is comprised of electronic circuitry, antennas, 
inter-connecting cables and engine generator sets. Failure rates of the last 
two items were discussed with Mr. James Horton and Mr. E. G. Otto of ERDL, Fort 
Belvoir l Maryland. No quantitative data are available on this subject; however, 
the general consensus is that failure rates are very low on diesel engine gene-
rators and newer type power and multiconductor cables. Practically all failures 
in this area can be attributed to unpredictable human errors. Similarly, no 
useable information could be found. on failure rates of radar antennas. _For 
these reasons, the following discussion deals solely with the electronic cir-
cuitry portion of the AN/TPQ-5( ) radar system. This accounts for a major 
Final Report, Project A-108, Operational Research Study for Counterbatteg 
Radar, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1954, Secret. 
share of the system failures; however, the other components should receive con-
sideration when information becomes available. In this discussion, no attempt 
is made to define precisely the degree of reliability required for a feasible 
CBR system. Such an undertaking is clearly beyond the scope of this project. 
The purpose here is to determine if a reasonable degree of realiability is 
attainable and to discuss ways of obtaining it. 
ARINC Reliability. Prediction Procedure. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. has made exten-
sive studies of electron tube reliability and causes of tube failure. More re-
cent studies, which consider the problem of design-stage prediction of electronic 
equipment reliability, have been published in a report that also contains infor-
mation for improving equipment reliability t  A brief summary of the ARINC pre-
diction method is given in Appendix C-1. An application of this procedure indi-
cates that it should be possible to attain a satisfactory degree of system 
reliability for the AN/TPQ-5( ) 
General Electric Co. Reliabilit Estimates. GE has made reliability predictions 
for the AN/TPQ-5( ) based on tube failure data from an AN/CPS-6B radar. The 
AN/CPS-6B is a heavy GCI ground radar employed by the Air Defense Command in 
its continental radar net. From this data it has been estimated that the proba-
bility of the proposed AN/TPQ-5( ) system surviving a 23-hour mission is 0.09; 
by applying preventive maintenance this figure can be raised to 0.62. These 
probabilities, based on a tube count of 1200, correspond. to mean times to fadl-
ure of approximately 9.5 and. 1.8 hours respectively. 
Per Cent Operable Time of Alternate Stems. In the Project A-108 report cited 
above, the mean repair times per failure for the M-33 radar system are give as 
follows: 
Total troubles per M-33 system per month. . 	o o 	 o 	 o o .10 
Total troubles per M-33 system per month repairable' 
by repairman assigned to each system 
	
7 
Total troubles per M-33 system per month requiring 
higher maintenance (Ordnance Support). 	 , 3 
tInvestigation of Electronic E uipment Reliability, Aeronautical Radio, Inc., 
Contract NObsi7-767577Feb. 15, 1956. 
Average time spent on trouble by repairman assigned 
to each system before repairing it or appealing 
. to higher maintenance ........... 	. 	 . .5 hrs. 
Average time spent on trouble by higher maintenance . . . . . . .6-8 hrs. 
Thus, the overall mean repair time, including higher maintenance repair time, 
is approximately seven hours with considerable variation expected for the 
individual repairs. With this figure as a guide, the GE estimates of system 
reliability given above have been used to compute the per cent operable time, 
excluding all movement and setup time, for the proposed AN/TPQ-5( ) systems. 
The results of these computations are shown in Figures C-1 and C-2. Without 
attempting any quantitative evaluation of these figures, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that for the systems with no preventive maintenance features, the 
per cent operable time is unacceptable, varying from 50 per cent to 66 per cent 
for mean repair times of 10 to 5 hours respectively. Similarly, the systems 
with preventive maintenance provisions seem reasonably acceptable with the per 
cent operable time varying from 83 per cent to 91 per cent for mean repair 
times of 10 to 5 hours respectively. Thus, one might conclude that with pre-
ventive maintenance provisions, the lower bound of acceptable operations might 
be attained. 
Consideration of Mode of Operation. For the purpose of making decisions regard-
ing equipment design for improved reliability, it is helpful to consider the 
probable mode of operation of a CBR. Such operation is characterized by: 
(1) Frequent movement, probably once each day under the cover of darkness. 
(2) Short periods (approximately four hours) of urgent need interspersed 
among longer periods of little or no need. 
Point (1) is well accepted; frequent movement can be expected because loca-
tion of the radar by enemy photo-intelligence, if by no other means, is almost 
inevitable after a period of 24 hours. For this reason, it is expected that 
movement of the radar will be made daily with at least the emplacement occurring 
after dark. 
Point (2) is not generally accepted by artillery personnel; however, the 
following arguments can be offered in its support. 
(a) Enemy artillery locations made during inactive periods are usually 
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Figure C-1. Per Cent Operable Time as a Function of Mean Repair Time for the 
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Figure C-2. Per Cent Operable Time as a Function of Mean Repair Time for the 



















































Since the Russians are known to employ roving guns and to move or conceal 
their artillery before offensive action, these stored locations are recog-
nized to be of questionable value. 
(b)Importance placed on stored locations is overemphasized because, in 
the past, it has been the only good source of enemy artillery targets. A good 
CBR should be able to change this picture by making sufficient locations during 
the active periods to keep counter-battery artillery fully occupied. 
(c) The desire has been expressed to maintain constant vigilance so that 
first round locations can be made of enemy atomic artillery. For several rea-
sons it does not appear that this information, even if obtainable, would 
lead to serious restriction of the enemy's capability of delivering atomic 
warheads. First, the lethal area of an atomic warhead is such that the first 
round would very likely be an active round which can not be stopped in flight 
by any presently known means. Furthermore, atomic warheads can now be delivered 
from rocket launchers, which incidently could not be located by the AN/TPQ-5( ), 
as well as a number of heavy artillery pieces; thus, destruction of a single 
enemy source of atomic warheads would have little overall effect. Finally, 
there is a good chance that a radar which tracks an atomic round will.be a 
casualty of this round before extrapolation of the trajectory is made. 
(d) If the enemy utilizes RDF equipment to locate radars, a CBR may be 
forced to remain "off the air" except during active periods. 
(e) By remaining "off the air" except during active periods, the proba-
bility of being ready when really needed can be increased,. 
Accepting the above mode of operation, the reliability requirement for the 
AN/TPQ-5( ) radar system might, for design purposes, be stated as follows: The 
AN/TPQ-5( ) radar system should have a reasonably high probability, say > 0.9, 
of being ready for operation, and when called upon, should have a reasonably 
high probability, say > 0.9, of remaining operable for at least four hours; 
such a system would thus have a probability, > 0.8, of being operable during 
tactically important periods, whenever they might occur, exclusive of radar 
movement time and periods of inclement weather. 
With the special preventive maintenance features referenced above, the 
probability of surviving a four-hour mission is estimated to be 0.92; this 
satisfies the above specification of, > 0.9. The problem then is to develop 
a system which will have a high probability of being operable after movement 
and will remain so until called upon. Although no quantitative information 
could be found on the effects of movement of radars, the general consensus is 
that it should not be an important factor if the equipment is properly designed 
for shocks. In regards to increaaing reliability during inactive periods, 
attention should be given to the effect Ou reliability of operating the equip-
ment in a stand-by condition (heaters energised but all other voltages off) 
att with reduced heater voltages. It is estimated in the ARIAV report that re- 
ducing the stand-by heater voltage to 0.8 of the rated value will decrease the 
relative failure rate by a factor of 10. 
In Appendix 0-2, a model which approximates the above mode of operation 
has been developed. Essentially this model assumes that the radar oscillates 
between pericds of operation and repair; movement of the radar, which. is con-
sidered to be of minor importance, has thus been omitted. Mission survival 
Probabilities computed for this model are given in Table 7,-1 below, These 
probabilities indicate that for a mean repair time of ten hours, the probability 
of the radar being operable during all of a randomly occurring four-hour period 
varies from 0.335 to 0.77 as the radar mean life is increased from 10 to 50 
hours; similarly, for a five-hour mean repair time, these probabilities vary 
from 0.45 to (i)84; finally, if the radar has standby provisions which maintain 
the radar operable at all times, these probabilities would approach 0.67 to 
0.92. These probabilities indicate that acceptable reliability is attainable 
if special provisions are made to build reliability into the system. 
Summary. It should be possible by proper design and preventive maintenance 
techniques to reach an acceptable level of reliability for the ANAPQ-5( ) radar 
t 
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TABLE C-1 
PROBABILITIES OF THE AN/TPQ-5( ) RADAR SYSTEM BEING OPERABLE DURING 
VARIOUS PORTIONS OF A RANDOMLY OCCURRING ACTIVE PERIOD OF LENGTH At 
Length of Active Periods (At) = Four Hours 
7 = Mean Repair Time, assumed to be exponentially distributed 
= Mean Time Between Failures, assumed to be exponentially distributed 
y 
(Hrs.) (Hrs.) 
Portion of Active Period During which Radar 
is Operable 











lo 	 0.335 





With perfect standby provisions which render the radar operable at all 





0.67 	I 	0.33 
1 




tMean repair time does not enter into the computations here because of the 
assumption below. 
ttThese probabilities are zero by assumption that the radar will always be 
operable at the start of the active period. 
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system. The differences in the reliability for the proposed separate and 
combined antenna alternatives are relatively small; the effects of building 
reliability into the system are much more important than effects of the slight 
differences in complexity of the alternate systems. 
In the process of building reliability into the system, special attention 
should be given to the mode of operation of the equipment. This leads to the 
recommendation that special attention be given to the problems of shock so that 
the equipment will withstand frequent movements without excessive start-up 
failures. It is also recommended that provisions be made to operate the equip-
ment in standby with reduced heater voltages to increase the reliability of the 





The ARINC procedure for design-stage prediction of system reliability is 
based on a subdivision of the system into components having different environ-
mental and/or operating conditions with further subdivisions of each component 
into parts such as tubes, resistors, relays, etc. 
The basis of the prediction method is then the reliability of those parts 
which make an appreciable contribution to unreliability. Reliability is 
defined as the probability of (X > t), where X is the length of a period of 
satisfactory operation, and t. is the time in hours. Assuming X is exponentially 
distributed, then 
X 	CO 	 X 
P(x > t) = 1 - 	e 	 e 	d)(= e 
where t is the mean length of a period of satisfactory operation. If a number 
of statistically independent parts must simultaneously perform satisfactorily, 
then 
n 	 n 
P(X > t) 	Pi (X > t) = 	11 e - t i = e 	i=1 t i . 
i=1 	 i=1 
It can be shown that the failure rate is approximately 0. Thus 
P(x > t) = e - t (Sum of part failure rates) 
This expression is applicable to the reliability of components as well as 
systems of components. 
Data are given in the ARINC study on the standard failure rates of parts. 
Suitable correction factors are given for design conditions such as tube heater 
voltages, ratio of actual to rated resistor power dissipation, ratio of actual 
to rated voltage on capacitors, and other operating conditions. The sum of 
the appropriate parts failure rates gives the component failure rates to whidi 
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P(X > t) =e 
special corrections are applied to allow for the effects of stresses peculiar 
to each component. These stresses include operating temperatures of parts, 
circuit margins of tolerance for any characteristic of any part within the 
component, maintenance conditions, etc. The reliability of the system is then 
obtained by summing the failure rates of the components. This estimate is 
modified by consideration of the effects of stresses introduced by the system 
design which includes allowances for redundancy of components in the system, 
system margins of tolerance for any characteristic of any component within the 
system, and system maintenance conditions. A block diagram of this procedure 
is given in Figure C-3. 
Assumptions Involved in Applyin• Above Procedure 
(1) The failure of any part, with the exception of redundant parts, ren-
ders the system useless (although it is known that a system may continue to 
perform its function in spite of the failure of some of its parts). 
(2) The failure rate of a specific part is assumed to be that of its 
class of parts. 
(3) Component (or system) correction factors are determined on the basis 
of the worst situation existing within the component (or system). 
(4) The basic failure rates and correction factors listed in the ARINC 
study are applicable to the AN/TPQ-5( ) under its particular environment. 
(5) The length of a period of satisfactory operation is exponentially 
distributed (constant failure rate). 
Assumptions (1) and (3) above tend to make reliability estimates, based 
on this procedure, pessimistic. However, of the three known applications of 
this technique made to date, the prediction errors have been 8, 5 and 15 per 
cent on systems containing 55, 200 and 500 tubes respectively. t 
Results Obtained from the Above Procedure 
t
Private communication with Mr. G. R. Herd, Aeronautical Radio Inc., Washing-
ton, D.C. 
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P(X > t) = e 
(PCF) = the pth Part Correction Factor 
K = No. of parts in the ith class of parts 
where i = 1,2, . 	, No, of Classes of Parts in the Component 
j = 1,2, , No. of Different Components in System 
= mean life between failures in hours 
t = time in hours 
Figure C-3. Block Diagram of ARINC Reliability Prediction Procedure, 
is the function which gives the probability of the system surviving a mission 
of length t, assuming the set operates at time t = 0. For reliability state-
ments couched in this manner, this expression can be used directly by substi-
tuting the appropriate value of t. 
Another useful expression can be obtained from the above function, i.e., 
the mean life to failure which can be estimated from the reciprocal of the 
{




Introduction. The purpose of this Appendix is to estimate mission survival 
probabilities for the AN/TPQ-5( ) radar which is operated as described in Annex 
C y i.e., frequent movement, and short periods of urgent need interspersed among 
relatively long periods of little or no need. 
The Model. To estimate these mission survival probabilities, the following 
simplified model is employed. 
(1)The radar is considered to be permanently emplaced. 
No quantitative information could be found on the effect of movement 
of radars; however, the general consensus is that it should not be an important 
factor if the equipment is properly designed for shocks. For this reason, move-
ment of the radar was omitted from this model. 
(2) The radar set is "worked" continuously and active periods occur at  
at random intervals. 
Ordinarily the set will oscillate between periods of operation and 
repair. If special standby provisions are provided, the set will vary among 
the three modes of operation: standby, operate, and repair. 
(Although points (1) and (2) above deviate considerably from the actual 
mode of operation of the equipment, they should serve as an adequate model for 
the purposes stated here provided that movement of the radar does not seriously 
affect reliability.) 
(3) Mean time to failure for the radar is denoted by , and the time to 
failure, t, is assumed to be exponentially distributed with probability density 
function u(t). 
u(t)= 	e-t/ 
There is considerable evidence available to support this assumption. t  
Aeronautical Radio, Inc., General Report No. 1, Investigation of Electron 
Tube Reliability in Military Applications, Jan. 4, 1954. 
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(4) Mean repair time for the radar is denoted by y, and the time for 
repair, t, is assumed to be exponentially distributed with probability density 
function v(t). 
t/7 
v(t) = 	e 
7 
It is felt that this is a reasonable assumption; however, no data are avail-
able to substantiate it. Fortunately, this assumption is of secondary impor-
tance in the derivation and computations which follow. 
Derivation of Prediction Equations. There are three possible outcomes 
for the radar operation during an active period, assuming the radar is "worked" 
continuously and active periods occur at random intervals. The radar can oper-
ate during (1) all, (2) part, or (3) none, of the active periods. Since these 
three outcomes are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, they form an additive set 
with combined probability of one. For convenience then, the probability of (1) 
and (3) will be computed and (2) will be obtained by difference 
1 - [P(1) 	P(5)] = P(2). 
For outcome [(1) all] to occur, two things must happen. 
(a) The radar must be operable at the start of the active period, 
(b) The radar must remain in operation during the entire active period. 
Similarly, for outcome [(3) none] to occur, two things must happen. 
(a) The radar must be inoperable at the start of the active period. 
(b) Repair of the radar must not be completed during the active 
period. 
Following is a derivation of the probability of occurrence of parts (a) 
in the above description. 
= mean working time between failures 
= mean repair time 
N
o = total number of sets under consideration 
N = number of sets operable at time t 
Then P
e 




operable at time t. t Since the radar must either be operable or in repair, 
P' = 1 - 	= 	7 - probability that any randomly selected radar set will 
7 t + 7 
be in repair. 
-(1 + )t 
No t + 7 
= 	HaN 	 e 7 t 
N
o 
t + 7 
If we let t = 00, then —N-1— I the steady state value. 
o 	
+ 7  
Thus P = -1--- - probability that any randomly selected radar set will be e 	+ 7 
If at the moment N sets are operable failures occur at the rate of 12. 
If at the moment N sets are operable, repairs occur at the rate of 
No  - N 
7 
Thus, the time rate of change of N is then the difference between the repair 
and failure rates, 
dN No N 
dt 	7 - 




7 	t 7 
which gives 
-  (
1 - + 1 )t N _ c e  7 _ 	
+ 7 * 
0 
Let N(0) = number of sets operable at time t = 0 
C = N(C)) No 	t 4- 7 
and 
tThis same expression has been derived, using a different approach to the 
problem, by D. P. Gayer of the Analytical Research Group of Princeton University. 
It appears in Memorandum Report B-6 titled, "Estimated Operability Characteris-
tics of a Radar Artillery Locator." 
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Following is a derivation of the probability of parts (b) in the above 
description. 
Let P(A) = probability of no failure to time t o 
P(B) = probability of failure during time (t o ) to (to + At) 
P(A,B) = probability of A and B occurring 
P(BIA) = probability of B occurring, given A has occurred, 
then 
to + At 
-t/t 
1 e 	dt . 
P(A B) 	 -e 
P(BIA) - 	/4A) - 
P(BIA) = 1 - e - At/t 
No failure during time (t o ) to (to + At), 
given that no failure has occurred to time t o 
= 1— P(BIA) = e-t/t 
The following can be derived in the same manner as above. 
-.nt/y = e 
given that the radar was not operable at time t
o 
From the above, the probability that the radar set will be operable during 
all of a randomly occurring active period of length At is given by 
P(All) - T1-7 e-At/t 
Similarly, the probability that the radar set will be operable during none 
of the active period is given by 
• P(None) _ 
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-to/t 	-(to At)A 
(No completion of radar repair during time (t o ) to (to + At), 
Finally, the probability that the radar set will be operable during part of the 
active period is given by 
P(Part) = 1 - [P(A11) + P(None)] 
The above formulae were used to compute the probabilities given in Table C-1 
of Annex C. 
Effects of Standby Provisions. It has been suggested that radar reliability 
during inactive periods can be increased by providing for standby operation 
(heaters energized but all other voltages off) with reduced heater voltage. 
The limit of the reliability improvement which could be effected by this means 
would be reached when the mean time to failure () in standby is infinite. 
Since it is unlikely that a radar failure occurring during an active period of 
operation would not be repaired before the next active period, infinite standby 
mean life would effectively mean that the radar would always be operable at the 
start of an active period. In this case the probability of the radar surviving 
all of a randomly occurring active period of length At is merely equal to e -tA. 
Since the probability of being operable during none of the active period is 
assumed to be zero, the probability of being operable during part of an active 
period is 1 - e -At//. These formulae were used to compute the probabilities 
given in Table C-1 of Annex C. 
ANNEX D. THE READINESS PROBABILITY CRITERION 
The "time factors" discussed in Section 2.12--movement time, reliability, 
and weather limitations--can each be regarded as imposing a restriction on the 
fraction of total calendar time during which the radar might be in "ready" con-
dition. While this is not the only light in which they can be viewed, such an 
approach is convenient because it allows several different factors to be tied 
together on a common basis. 
In this annex, time-factor influences will be illustrated by a hypotheti-
cal "middle-of-the-road" example. The long-term average effect of each factor 
will first be discussed as if all other sources of dead-time were absent, and 
the results will then be combined into an estimate of the system's "readiness 
probability." 
Movement Time. The sum of the system's average tear-down, transport, and set-up 
times has been called "movement time," M. If the average frequency of movement 
is denoted by m, the fraction of total time Fm during which the radar is set 
up in operating position is just 
F 	1 - MM. m 
As mentioned in Section 2,12, the average set-up time for the separate-
antenna system is estimated to be about 1.25 hours, assuming adequate site 
preparation and presuming night-time emplacement so that operation can begin 
before camouflaging and sandbagging is completed, Similarly, the average 
tear-down time for an orderly withdrawal is estimated to be 50 minutes. 
Military personnel have stated that a CBR will probably have to be moved 
at least once a day both for tactical reasons and to stay one jump ahead of 
enemy photointerpreters. At the same time, it appears that it would be dif-
ficult to move more often than once per day because opportunity for emplace-
ment seems restricted to night time; the activity involved in setting up 
in a prominent site would be too conspicuous in daylight. A typical frequency 
of movement will therefore be taken as once per day. 
For an estimate of average transport time, it will be assumed that the 
route consists of four miles by road, covered at 15 miles per hour, and 1.5 
miles off-road at two miles per hour. The transport time would then be 1.02 
hours. 
Under these conditions, a "typical" movement time is 3.1 hours, which for 
one move per day gives Fm = .87. 
Reliability. The quantity Pe derived in Annex C, the probability that a ran-
domly selected CBR will be operable at an arbitrarily chosen time, can also be 
interpreted as the long-term average fraction of total time during which a sin-
gle set is in operable condition. If the set is in standby most of the time 
with negligible failure rate, P e approaches unity; while if an attempt is made 
to keep the set on the air continuously P e is given by 
P 	_ 	 
e +y 1 + 
where = mean life to failure 
and y = mean repair time. 
From the second expression above it is evident that P e is really a function 
only of the ratio of mean life to mean repair time. The behavior of this func-
tion is shown in Figure D-1. 
Assuming from the discussion of Annex C that preventive maintenance can 
extend the mean life to 1i8 hours and that the mean repair time for the residual 
unanticipated failures is 7 hours, Pe would be .87 if no time were spent in 
standby. Without preventive maintenance it is estimated that the mean life 
would drop to 9.5 hours, but the mean repair time might also be shorter because 
of a greater incidence of relatively simple troubles. For a mean repair time 
of 5 hours, Pe would then be .66. 
Weather Limitations. It is expected that an X-band CBR will be disabled by 
even very slight precipitation. .Estimates of the percentage of time during 
which precipitation occurs, as determined by season and locality, are shown on 
the maps of Annex B. 
An attempt has been made to obtain a representative figure for purposes 
of illustration by averaging the map percentages for the United States, Europe 
(including Russia to the Urals), and southeastern Asia. The results are given 
in the following table. 
THE RELIABILITY FACTOR 
P e 	y 
.= MEAN WORKING TIME TO FAILURE 
y =MEAN REPAIR TIME 
1.0 
0 
0 	 2 	 4 	 6 	 8 	 10 	 12 	 14 	 16 	 18 
P e 
Figure D-1. The Reliability Factor Pe as a Function of the Ratio c/y. 
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AVERAGE FREQUENCY OF PRECIPITATION (PER CENT TIME) 
Months United States 





Dec-Jan-Feb 18.0 17.9 13.5 
Mar-Apr-May 14.2 13.1 15.3 
June-July-Aug 7.4 8.6 16.9 
Sept-Oct-Nov 13.3 14.5 13.5 
Year-Round Average 13.3 13.5 14.8 
Year-Round Average over all Localities = 13.7 
It should be recognized that because of the wide variation in climate from 
place to place and season to season, the "averages" obtained in this way must 
be regarded with suspicion and interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the 
year-round averages for the three regions considered are nearly the same, and 
the use in an example of the year-round average over all localities--about 14 
per cent--seems not unreasonable. 
Accordingly, it will be assumed that the long-term average fraction of 
total time during which the weather is favorable for CBR operation, F w, is .86. 
Combined Effects, If movement, reliability, and weather effects were non-
interacting the over-all fraction of total time during which the radar might be 






If other possible sources of dead-time are disregarded, this expression 
should be nearly correct. Weather and movement can be considered independently, 
for while it would be desirable to plan moves so as to "conserve" fair weather 
time for operation, it is unlikely that one could do so with regularity. Move-
ment and reliability are suitably non-interacting, since movement-induced 
failures are expected to be few and repairs probably cannot be effected while 
the set is in transit. Therefore, for the expression given above to be correct 
only one further restriction would be required: confinement of all failures and 
repairs to periods of fair weather. This condition is evidently not met; fail-
ures can be assumed to occur only when the set is operating, but repairs can 
continue during precipitation. Examination will show, however, that only a slight 
correction is needed. Depending upon the way in which occurrences of •recipitation 
ght01411110EPAWIL 
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are distributed in time, F varies between a figure given by the expression 
above and an upper limit obtained by substituting for Pe the quantity 
Pew 	+ yFw). (See Appendix D-1.) 
In the example considered here, P e for a well-designed, continuously 
worked CBR has been estimated to be .87 with preventive maintenance 	= 48 
hours, y = 7 hours) and .66 without preventive maintenance 	= 90 5 hours, 
y = 5 hours). For the assumed "typical" value Fw = .86, the corresponding 
figures for Pew are .89 and .69. The weather-reliability interaction effect 
is thus very slight, and it.will be sufficient to assume a single set of inter-
mediate figures, .88 and .67 respectively. 
The use of the '"middle-of-the-road" values 
Fm  . .87 
F = .86 
w 
1; continuous standby, negligible failure rate. 
P = 	.88; good design, preventive maintenance. 
.67; good design, no preventive maintenance. 
leads to the following values for the readiness probability F: 
(a) Continuous standby, negligible failure rate--F = .75 
(b) Good design, preventive maintenance 	--F = .66 
(c) Good design, no preventive maintenance --F = .50 
In the role of continuous surveillance envisioned by military personnel, 
it appears that over a long period a CBR might be found in "ready" condition 
about 66 per cent of the time. Inadequate attention to preventive maintenance 
would reduce the figure; operation of the set in standby during inactive periods 
might increase it. 
It should be borne in mind that these calculations apply only to a 
restricted example, which, while believed to be a reasonable basis for illus-
trating the long-term average outlook ) is entirely hypothetical. Conditions 
encountered in specific tactical engagements can obviously differ drastically 
from those assumed. Furthermore, not all sources of dead-time have been con-
sidered. The possibility of shell-fragment damage is considerable, as can be 
seen from the discussion of Annex E. Also, it might sometimes be infeasible 
to proceed immediately to a new site after a withdrawal, particularly when the 
small:Mal& 
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withdrawal has been forced in daylight by enemy activity Periods in which 
radar operation is curtailed by enemy activity, as well as periods of unfav-
orable weather, could unfortunately be times of great tactical need. 
APPENDIX D-1 
The expression Pe = N 0 = 	+ y) is obtained in Annex C as the steady 
state solution to the differential equation 
dN No N  
dt 	7 
where N sets, out of an ensemble (actual or imaginary) of N o sets, are in oper-
able condition. Here NA is the failure rate and (No - N)/7 is the repair 
rate. 
Now if the influence of weather is to be considered, the failure rate must 
be replaced by (NA) fw (t) where fw (t) is a "weather function" such that Nf w (t) 
is the number of sets actually operating at any time. (It is assumed that all 
operable sets are worked continuously during periods of fair weather and turned 
off during periods of precipitation.) The repair rate, however , remains un-
changed. Thus the differential equation becomes 
dN 
dt - 




Obviously, the form of the solution to this equation depends upon the 
functional form of f
w (t), so that it is not possible to exhibit 
a meaningful 
general solution. However, the weather influence can be examined. adequately 
without formally solving the equation. Let us first observe that if the equa-
tion had an equilibrium solution, that solution could be obtained by simply 
equating the failure and repair rates, since in the equilibrium condition 
dN/dt = 0. Such is the case for the unmodified reliability problem, and the 
solution Pe = (t + 7) follows immediatply from the requirement (i0 -N)4 = NA. 
Now when weather effects are introduced this equilibrium condition will be 
destroyed, and we must examine instead the steady state condition (dN/dt)
avg =0, 
or 





In order to make something worthwhile out of this expression, we must 
restrict our attention for the moment to the limiting case wherein both the 
mean duration of periods of fair weather and the mean duration of periods of 
precipitation are short compared to the mean life and the mean repair time 7. 
Under these circumstances neither the total number of operable sets nor the 
probability that an individual set is in operable condition undergoes any great 
excursion with changes in the weather, so that we may replace N/N o by (N/N ) o avg 
and (N/N o  ) fw  (t) by (0o)avg Fw







0 where Pew - 	 No)avg 	 Fw7 
Thus the interaction effect of this limiting-case kind of weather can be intro-
duced simply by replacing 7 by 7Fw in the expression for P e . 
Let us now consider the opposite extreme: mean duration of both fair weather 
and precipitation periods very long compared to the mean life and mean repair 
time. Here the probability of an individual set being operable undergoes great 
excursions with changes in the weather. At the end of a long period of precipi-
tation, failures which may have occurred earlier will almost surely have been 
repaired. When operation is resumed, the probability of being operable is there-
fore nearly one initially and begins to decay thereafter toward the equilibrium 
value Pe, where it remains until the next occurrence of precipitation. During 
the period of unfavorable weather the probability builds up again toward unity. 
Now since the time between weather changes is assumed to be very long, the 
set's probability of being operable remains equal to P e throughout all but a 
negligibly small part of each period of fair weather. Under these circumstances 
the fraction of total time during which the weather is fair and the set is oper-
able is just Pe • Fw . In this limit, there is no significant weather-reliability 
interaction. 
We now have two limiting-case expressions, P e ° Fw and Pew . Fw, which 
establish bounds on the weather and reliability influences upon the set's "readi-
ness probability" F. The weather-reliability interaction, which tends to make 
F larger for a fixed Fw, increases with increasing frequency of weather changes. 
Fortunately, for practical values of F w and C7 0 the spread between these bounds 
is not very great. 
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ANNEX E. VULNERABILITY ESTIMATES 
If a CBR is to be a feasible device, it. must have a reasonable chance of 
survival in a battlefield environment. Good camouflage can do much to lessen 
the probability of identification by air and ground observers, and frequent move-
ment can reduce the effectiveness of photointerpretation for detection and fire 
direction. Nevertheless, such evasive measures are never' infallible, and loca-
tion by RDF techniques cannot be discounted. Inevitably, the system will at 
some time be brought under fire. It seems essential to make some estimate of 
the vulnerability of CBR equipment to artillery attack. In making efforts in 
this direction, RES was fortunate to obtain the cooperation of the Combat Devel-
opment Department (CDD), TAGMS, Fort Sill, 
Vulnerability estimates are customarily made by calculating and tabulating 
effective "lethal areas" for specific shells against specific types of targets 
such as personnel or trucks; manipulation of these tables gives the probability 
of obtaining one or more hits in a critical spot. However, since it is not 
known at present just what kinds of damage might disable a CBR nor where criti-
cal components will be physically situated, a different approach is necessary. 
..For an approximate analysis, the component units of the radar can be represented 
by simple geometric shapes: vertical planes for the antenna reflectors, a sphere 
for the radome, and "boxes" for the operations vans. Vulnerability can be 
expressed in terms of a measure such as the expected number of fragment hits 
through any surface resulting from a concentration of given shell density. 
Such was the problem suggested to Lt. Col. Otis Spears and his associates, 
a CDD group currently engaged in advanced studies of artillery effects and tar-
get vulnerabilities. Preliminary calculations have been completed and made 
available for presentation here. A more detailed paper will be published by 
CDD in about two months. 
The assumed target model is sketched below. It will be noted that for the 
antenna units only the surface area of the reflector itself is considered; the 
trailers and electronics units thereon are disregarded. Some degree of protec-
tion could be given these parts by partially digging-in the trailers. 






   





Tracker - 6' x 8° ellipse Searcher - 7° x 11' rectangle 
    
Van - box, 8' x 20° x 9' he 	 - same 
Sketch, of Target Area 
Calculations were made for two classes of weapons: heavy and light. The 
105mm Howitzer was chosen as representative of light artillery, and the 8" How-
itzer was chosen as the heavy weapon. 
It was assumed that the fire of a single battery firing open sheaf was 
directed at the installation. For the 105mm Howitzer, intended CI's were placed 
30 yards apart on a line bisecting the target in range, The 8" Howitzer intended 
CI's were placed 50 yards apart on the same line. 
The table below gives the expected number of fragments penetrating each 
unit for one battery volley. The figures apply for superquick bursts or low 
air bursts. It should be noted that the expected number of penetrations is 
directly proportional to the number of battery volleys. Also, if the batteries 
in a battalion are not widely dispersed laterally, figures for battalion N 
volleys may be obtained as follows: Expected penetrations for battallion N 
volleys = 3Nn, where n is the tabulated figure for a single battery volley. 
EXPEClhD NUMBER OF PENETRATIONS FOR ONE BATTERY VOLLEY 
Tracker Searcher Radome 	Each Vant 
Each Van  
(Sandbagged) 
105mm How .156 .320 1.75 1.047 .695 
8" How .596 1.217 4.96 3.442 2.295 
tPartially dug-in; roof 6' above ground surface. 
ttPartially dug-in; roof 6' above ground surface; sandbagged around sides to 
a level 3' below roof. 
NOTE: Fragmentation data is not available for distances less than 20 feet 
from a burst. Therefore, there is an area surrounding each target, 
with its boundaries at least 20 feet from the target, which was not 
included in the area over which integrations were taken. 
ANNEX F. THE BATTERY ACQUISITION PROBLEM 
It is of interest to consider how many shells a CBR must accitire in 
order to locate a certain fraction of the batteries whose shells it can 
see. Once the CBR locks on to a shell, the shell may prove to be visible 
for too short a time for successful extrapolation, the extrapolation time 
may be excessive, or the shell may turn out to be from a battery already 
located. Thus there will be a certain amount of time-consuming "waste 
motion", and by assuming a possible artillery situation one can get an idea 
of how serious the problem is likely to be. Work along these lines is being 
carried out in a related study, Project A-190. Some preliminary results 
are cited here. 
The artillery situation assumed is that of a 10,000 yard corps front, 
with weapon disposition according to the artillery model discussed in Annex A. 
A CBR with a 300 search sector is assumed to be situated 4000 yards behind 
the Zone of Contact (Z/C). Under these circumstances there would be a total 
of about 40 batteries within the radar's search sector, distributed as 
follows: light artillery, 26 batteries, 2000 to 5000 yards behind Z/C; 
medium artillery, 10 batteries, 5000 to 8000 yards; heavy artillery, 4 
batteries, 8000 to 11,000 yards. This distribution of artillery is more 
dense than one would normally expect where threat of atomic attack is imminent, 
but it is somewhat less dense than the extreme maximum concentration antici-
pated at Ft. Sill (which implies a 6000 yard corps front). 
The fire from these batteries is assumed to follow the classification 
given in Table A-6 and Table A-7 of Annex A. The four cases presented in 
these tables will be referred to here as Cases I through IV: 
Case I - 50 mil mask, best case (minimum charges) 
Case II - 50 mil mask, worst case (maximum charges) 
Case III - 100 mil mask, best case (minimum charges) 
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WHICH USAB LE FIRE IS SEEN 
Now in order to estimate the probability of obtaining a usable track 
from any one specific battery, one must know something about how mission 
assignments are distributed among the several batteries of a given class. 
It is, conceivable, for example, that in the course of an engagement each 
individual battery might be called upon to carry out all of the types of 
fire missions typically assigned to artillery of its class, so that a 
usable trajectory might come from any battery of a given type with equal 
likelihood. An alternative and probably more realistic assumption is that 
the usable trajectories come only from certain batteries, while the fires 
of other batteries of the same class are never seen or are always unsuitable 
for extrapolation. Both situations are considered here. In the latter 
case, the usable fire from a given class of artillery is taken to be distri-
buted equally among a number of batteries determined from the assumption 
(Number of batteries of 
a given class firing 
usable trajectories) 
 
(Amount of usable fire 
from batteries of 
the class) 
(Total number of batteries 
of the class) 
(Total amount of fire 
from batteries of the 
class) 
The approximate numbers of loaccessiblE0 0 batteries given by this expression 
are shown in the following table. 
The results of random sampling experiments carried out for both of 
these extreme situations are presented in Figures F-1 through F-4. The 
curves show the average number of different batteries located for a given 
number of projectiles acquired. Situations where mission assignments are 
varied over all batteries are indicated by the letter "a" following the 
case number; those where mission assignments are not varied are indicated 
by the letter "b". 
The low efficiency of the location process is evident from inspection 
of the graphs. It is due partially to repetitive location of the same 
batteries and partially, in some cases, to the fact that not all visible 
trajectories are suitable for extrapolation. In the eta ti cases one could, 
as expected, eventually locate all 40 batteries (except in case IVa„ where 
of the many light artillery trajectories seen, none is uaable). However, 
even in Case Ia., where all visible trajectories are usable, the CBR would 
have to acquire nearly 100 shells to locate an average of 90 per cent of 
the batteries within its sector. In the 20 b 1, cases only a fraction of the 
batteries in the sector could be located. Again in Case Ib all visible 
trajectories are usable, but to locate 214 out of the 27 accessible batteries 
would acquire around 90 acquisitions. In the less favorable situations, not 
only does the number of accessible batteries fall off, but the efficiency 
with which even these are located decreases as many of the visible trajec-
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NUMBER OF DIFFERENT BATTERIES LOCATED 
Figure F-1. Average Number of Different Batteries Located as a Function of the Number of Shells 
Acquired; Cases Ia and IIa. 
10 
0 
Figure F-2. Average Number of Different Batteries Located as a Function of the Number of Shells 
Acquired; Cases IIIa and IVa. 
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NUMBER OF DIFFERENT BATTERIES LOCATED 
Figure F-3. Average Number of Different Batteries Located as a Function of the Number of Shells 
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Ib: Charges selected for maximum radar visibility 
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Figure F-4. Average Number of Different Batteries Located as a Function of the Number of Shells 
Acquired; Cases IIIb and IVb. 
The questions now arise of how long it might take the radar to locate 
an appreciable percentage of the batteries accessible to it and how much 
damage the enemy artillery might inflict in the meantime. 
It can be shown that if visible trajectories appear randomly at an 
average rate /0, and if k is the probability of the tracker locking-on 
to a trajectory seen by the search set, then the rate at which acquisitions 
are made is 
k 
R AP where A 
1 + k 
Here all is the Ilsolution time", or time required to return to search after 
a shell is acquired. It will be assumed to be the same whether or not the 
extrapolation is successful, although in practice one would expect a shorter 
delay in those instances where the visible time turns out to be too short 
for extrapolation. Neglected, however, is the time spent in returning to 
search after acquisition has been attempted but lock-on has failed. The 
effects of these simplifying assumptions tend to balance each other. Actually, 
the lock-on probability will depend upon where the shell appears in the 
search sector, but here the average value k is assumed to apply to all 
visible shells. 
The factor A gives the fraction of visible rounds which are acquired. 
It is plotted in Figure F-5 as a function of k and 	It will be seen 
that at very low rates of fire, k has a dominant influence upon Ai while 
when several shells can appear in the time interval required for problem 
solution, A approaches 1/Pr. 
Reference to the artillery model gives an idea of the rates that might 
be expected. If all weapons fire at their maximum sustained rates, then 
about 200 rounds per minute are fired within the radars search sector, and 
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Figure F-5. The Acquisition Factor A Versus pr. 
CASE 	 VISIBLE FIRE 	USABLE 	FIRE 
ROUNDS/MIN. ROUNDS/MIN. 
I 	 115 	 115 
II 94 46 
III 	 97 	 42 
IV 46 11 
For Cases I, II, and III visible trajectories appear at a rate of 
about 100 per minute; for Case IV, at about 50 per minute. From Figure 
F-5 one can obtain the acquisition rate figures given in Table F-1 for 
the situations where all weapons fire at 100, 10 or 1 per cent of their 
sustained rates. A problem solution time of one minute, as anticipated 
for the service test model CBR, was used in making the tabulation. 
When the weapons fire at their sustained rates the acquisition rate 
is substantially that at which problems can be solved. Even at one per 
cent of the sustained rate, loss of efficiency from saturation effects is 
pronounced when the lock-on probability is high. Saturation can therefore 
be expected to be a problem for more widely dispersed weapon distributions 
as well. More serious at the lower rates, however, is the drop in acquisi-
tion rate with decreasing lock-on probability. 
Consideration of these acquisition rates in conjunction with Figures 
F-1 through F-4 shows that even when the enemy fire is sufficiently rapid 
to maintain radar saturation, location of most of the accessible batteries 
may take one to four hours of radar operation time, exclusive of time 
spent registering friendly artillery. Furthermore, the number of batteries 
accessible may be only a small fraction of the total number within the 
sector. While location is being attempted, the enemy has the capability 
of delivering thousands of rounds. 
TABLE F-1. ACQUISITION RATES FOR MODEL ARTILLERY SITUATION. 
















k = .2 
, 
Acquired per 
k = . 8 
Hour 
k = 1.0 
Cases I, II, III 
100 12,000 6,000 57 59 59 
lo 1 , 200 600 40 53 55 
1 120 60 10 27 30 
Case IV 
100 12,000 3,000 55 59 59 
10 1,200 300 30 48 50 
1 120 30 5.4 17 20 
Even this distressing picture may be somewhat optimistic. The loss 
of efficiency from acquiring unusable trajectories can become worse if the 
multiple target problem discussed in the A-108 report materializes or if 
many artillery trajectories first become visible at ranges where extraneous 
mortar and rocket fires are encountered. Moreover, the assumption that 
shells are fired randomly can be a poor approximation for periods of low 
activity. Projectiles are customarily fired in battery volleys, each 
volley representing one ' , opportunity" for acquisition, and it is the 
"opportunity rate" which must be used in the expression for the acquisi-
tion rate R when activity is low. This modification can reduce R by as 
much as a factor of four. Furthermore, even when the average rate of fire 
is low, volleys may come in "bursts" of high activity interspersed among 
periods of relative quiet. In this event the volley rate during a burst 
determines A and the average rate of volley delivery is multiplied by A 
to determine the average acquisition rate R. The rate of fire over a short 
interval can be several times the maximum sustained rate. Consequently, 
saturation can be serious even in periods of very low average activity. 
It must be borne in mind that many of the considerations which 
contribute to the discouraging outlook presented here apply equally well 
to other battery location schemes, including those such as sound and flash 
ranging that have been used successfully enough to be considered worthwhile. 
While the prospective efficiency of the presently envisioned CBR seems 
clearly low, the need for even low effectiveness may justify the costs of 
obtaining it. The intent here is simply to point out, first, that in its 
proposed form a CBR should not be expected to have a revolutionary influence 
upon artillery warfare; and second, that superb performance already recognized 
as desirable does indeed appear to be urgently needed in the following 
respects: 
(1) Ability to acquire targets close to the terrain mask. 
(2) Ability to perform extrapolations from shorter tracks. 
(3) Ability to extrapolate accurately over longer times of flight. 
(4) Ability to perform extrapolations more rapidly. 
(5) Achievement of high lock-on probability. 
(6) Achievement of smooth tracking in the presence of multiple targets. 
(7) Ability to recognize and discard quickly unusable tracks. 
It might also be remarked that development of a unified fire direction 
system capable of silencing a battery soon after its location could alleviate 
the problem of redundant locations. 
